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INTRODUCTION
Property scholars can roughly be divided into two theoretical camps: those that
understand property to be a unique and cohesive conceptual domain and those who
do not.' The fundamental question that is dividing property scholars is whether
2
property represents a distinct conceptual approach to law.
3
The answer is not obvious. Property is basically about the ownership of things.
Ownership, in turn, is about our right to use and possess things.' But other areas of
law also inform our right to use and possess things: contract, criminal law, tort, and
even constitutional law all have something to say about the use and possession of
objects in the world.5 More pointedly, law and economic scholars, in particular, have
argued that property rules serve only to set background entitlements that serve as the
6
basis for future exchanges. From this perspective, property (or "ownership") is
nothing more than a series of in personam legal obligations-in other words, a subset
7

of contracts.

' See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory ofProperty, 90 CORNELLL. REV. 531, 531
(2005) ("[M]odern property scholarship has utterly splintered the field. On the one hand, instrumentalists
view property as nothing more than default contract rules. On the other hand, conceptualists proclaim the
primacy of in rem rights and specially privileged rights such as the rights to exclude, to use, and to transfer.

Still other legal scholars think of property as a 'bundle of sticks' capable of assuming any shape or form.").
What Bell and Parchomovsky describe as "bundle of sticks" scholars is a specific type of nonconceptualist approach.
2 See id at 534-37 (describing the conceptualist/non-conceptualist divide in property theory); see also

Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Contract/PropertyInterface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 775
(2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Interface] (describing form restriction as a "fundamental
characteristic[] that distinguish property and contract as legal institutions").

Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 1, at 577 ("It is crucial to clarify that in the context of property, the
term 'thing' extends beyond physical objects. Property's usage of the concept of 'thing' is capacious,

including not just tangible items but also ideas and qualities.").
John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a ComparativeRight, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1011-12 (2003)
(describing ownership as "the right to exclude others, the right to use and possess without interference by
others, and the right to transfer ownership to others").
s See Peter Benson, Contract as a Transfer of Ownership, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1673 (2006)
(describing how contract law affects property interests).
6 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Propertyin Law and Economics, 111 YALE

L.J. 357, 376 (2001) [hercinafter Merrill & Smith, What Happened] ("For modern economists, property
rights are primarily regarded as a prerequisite for exchange.").
Id at 370-71 ("In addition to providing the analytical framework for subsequent efforts by economists
to explain property rights, certain of the expository aspects of Coase's article also exerted a pervasive
influence over subsequent thinkers ... [Coasc] implicitly modeled property rights as a collection of in
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This Article takes the opposite position. This Article takes the position that
property is a conceptually distinct area of law, and what makes it conceptually
distinct is the principle of numerus clausus.5 Numerus clausus is a common law rule
imposed by judges that demands that every legal ownership arrangement fits within
a restrictive menu of existing forms of ownership-the life estate, the fee simple, and
so forth.9 In defending the fundamental role of numerus clausus in property doctrine,
this Article articulates the best-case-scenario for understanding property as an
analytic archetype.
Ifproperty "counts" as a legal analytic archetype-or, if property is a coherent
legal concept-it must be because the legal concept of "property" can be said to have
criterial features.Io There must be at least one criterion we can point to that separates
property from, say contract." Most commonly, conceptualists understand that
criterion to be the principle of numerus clausus, a common law rule that imposes a
restriction on allowable forms of ownership.1 2 In contrast, non-conceptualists do not

personam rights. Insofar as the two-party model was to become the norm for subsequent law and
economics treatments of property rights, this made it all the easier to overlook the differences between in
personam and in rem rights.").
'I have elaborated on this aspect of the thesis elsewhere. See Meredith M. Render, Complexity in Property,

81 TENN. L. REV. 79, 93-96, 124-28 (2014) [hereinafter Render, Complexity]; see also Meredith M.
Render, The Law ofthe Body, 62 EMORY L.J. 549, 562-68 (2013).

9 Nestor M. Davidson, Standardizationand Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1598
(2008) ("[P]roperty law recognizes only a limited and standard list of mandatory forms."); see also JESSIE
DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & MICHAEL H. SCILL, PROPERTY 197 (2010)
("By requiring that property owners create only legally recognized property interests, which have a
standardized form, the principle [of numerus clausus] directly restricts freedom of ownership."
(describing numerus clausus as "legally mandated list of immutable forms")).
0

' See Ken Kries, Modern Jurisprudence,PostmodernJurisprudence, and Truth, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1871,
1878 ("[T]he truth-conditional perspective maintains that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for
the truth of legal propositions. A slightly weaker thesis . . . maintains that there are criteria for the correct
application of legal concepts and propositions, criteria that might fall short of necessary and sufficient

conditions.").
" Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardizationin the Law ofProperty: The Numerus

ClaususPrinciple, I10 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus] ("A central
difference between contract and property concerns the freedom to 'customize' legally enforceable
interests.").
2 Of course, some disagreements exist among conceptualists with respect to what "counts" as the criterial
features of property. See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 1, at 535 ("The conceptualists ... insist[]
on the primacy of in rem."); Stephen R. Munzer, A Bundle Theorist Holds On to His CollectionofSticks,

8 ECON J. WATCH 265 (2011) [hereinafter Munzer, Bundle Theory] (concluding that "the right to exclude"
is a potentially criterial feature for Merrill and Smith).
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view form restriction as a necessary or important (or in some versions, extant) feature
13
of property or property systems.
However, before turning to the merits of these two positions, it is important to
pause for a moment to consider the real-world application and significance of the
conceptualist/non-conceptualist divide. Does it make a difference in the real-world
if we categorize an ownership arrangement as falling in the domain of property as
opposed to contract?
The 2007-2008 financial collapse provides a striking application of the
conceptualist/non-conceptualist divide-as well as an excellent illustration of the
magnitude of its continued importance. The 2007-2008 financial collapse was fueled
by many variables, but virtually all experts agree that one of the most significant
contributing factors was the proliferation of "opaque" securities, such as synthetic
5
4
collateralized debt obligations ("CDO").' A CDO is a type of derivative.' The value
6
of a CDO is dependent upon the performance of a set of underlying assets.1 At base,
a CDO is comprised of a set of promises in which the buyer pays a premium to the
seller and the seller promises to pay the buyer a large lump sum in the event of a
7
default in the underlying asset.' The buyer is betting that the underlying asset will
default, and the seller is betting that it will not."
Despite the fact that CDOs are traded en masse in huge volumes, each CDO is
potentially unique." Each CDO represents a customizable set of in personam

" See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note I1, at 6 (stating that some scholars "tend to react to
manifestations of the numerus clausus as if it were nothing more than outmoded formalism").
14 See, e.g., R. Christopher Whalen, The Subprime Crisis: Cause, Effect and Consequences, 17 SPG J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 219, 220 (2008) (citing "the rapid growth of over-thecounter (OTC) derivatives and securities" as a cause of the crisis).

15 Id
16 Lynn A. Stout, Uncertainty, Dangerous Optimism, and Speculation: An Inquiry Into Some Limits of
Democratic Governance, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 1177, 1184-85 (2012) ("Derivatives are literally betscontractual agreements between two parties that one will pay the other an amount of money determined
by whether or not some future event occurs.").
17

Id

'" Id. at 1185 ("[D]erivatives are fundamentally wagers, they offer a unique opportunity for pessimists to

try to make profits betting on falling prices.").
19 See Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex FinancialProducts, 90

WASH. U. L. REv. 63, 70 (2012) ("Complex financial instruments are difficult to understand and value,
because their risks are not easily measured and controlled. This is attributable to the potential complexity
of the specific reference assets and the structure of the transactions.").
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promises to pay money (when certain conditions are met), rather than an irrevocable
exchange of underlying assets. 2 0 Consequently, CDOs are contracts.21 If by way of
contrast, a CDO were an irrevocable exchange of the underlying assets (i.e., a bank

sold mortgagor debt to an investor without a promise to pay in the event of default),
then it would be property.
The fact that CDOs are structured as contracts rather than property (which
requires standardization and form restriction) contributed to-and perhaps even
caused-the financial collapse of 2007-2008.22 In retrospect, the most conspicuous
problem with the proliferation of CDOs that included bundled subprime mortgages
was the fact that investors had a great deal of difficulty assessing their risk of loss. 23

Even large institutional investors like Goldman Sachs, which had an enormous
capacity to compute risk, were unable to accurately track their risk.2 4 This was
because the contracts that determined the value of the CDOs were not standardized.
Each contract could be individually customized to suite the particular risk-hedging
needs of the buyer and seller. When these individually customized instruments were
then bundled and sold en masse, it became impossible to determine with any
accuracy the value of the package. 25 So although they were regarded, traded, and
(semi) regulated as though they were stable financial assets, CDOs behaved like
highly unstable personal contracts.
This disastrous discontinuity between how 2007-era CDOs were regarded and
how they ultimately behaved is attributable to the woefully mistaken but widespread
(non-conceptualist) belief that there is no essential difference between a conventional
property asset (like debt) and a customizable promise pay. This belief gravely

20

Se Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the HousingBubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 118384 (2012) ("The structure of these products made them very difficult to gauge, and hence price, their risk
accurately.").
21

Stout, supra note 16, at 1178 (describing CDOs as "contractual arrangements").

' Levitin & Wachter, supra note 20, at 1183-84 ("[F]ailure of markets to price risk correctly due to the
complexity, opacity, and heterogeneity of the unregulated private-label mortgage-backed securities" led
to the financial crisis.).
23 Omarova, supra note 19, at 69 ("One of the fundamental causes of that crisis,
however, was the

unprecedented level of complexity of financial products and markets.").
24 Sanjeev Arora, Boaz Barak, Markus Brunnermeier & Rong Ge, Computational Complexity and
Information Asymmetry in FinancialProducts 2-3 (Princeton Univ., Working Paper, Oct. 19, 2009),
https://www.cs.emu.edu/-odonnell/hitsO9/arora-barak-brunncrmcier-ge-complexity-of-fmancialderivatives.pdf.
2

id
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misapprehends the role that form restriction plays in providing a bulkhead against
the kind of opaque complexity that devastated the U.S. financial system in 20072008. Financial instruments that fall within the conceptual extension of "property"
are subject to the rule of numerus clausus and are not customizable. This rule exists
to avoid the very failing that lay at the heart of the financial crisis: an overwhelming
complex system of property exchange.
Because confusion about the role of numerus clausus can lead to disastrous
results as in the case of the financial crisis, the first objective of this Article is to
clarify the conceptualist account of "property" and the central role of numerus
clausus.
A second agenda point of this Article is to defend the conceptualist account of
property from its most dogged normative criticism: the criticism that conceptualist
26
accounts of property champion a deleterious form of legal formalism. This
criticism, which has pursued the conceptualist account since its nascent days, has
much intuitive appeal.27 After all, ifproperty comprises a unique conceptual domain,
it is a domain characterized by some pretty unpopular traits. In a world (legal and
otherwise) that is increasingly focused on fluid concepts, where continuums are
preferred to categories, the conceptual approach of property is rightly understood to
be inflexible and constraining.
This Article concedes that the distinguishing characteristic of property is a kind
of formalism, but argues that it is not the kind of formalism that is problematic in the
ways that non-conceptualists anticipate. Instead, formalism, it turns out, is a virtue
in the context of ownership. This Article posits that form restriction in property

26 See Davidson, supra note 9, at 1646 (describing the realist challenge to conceptualists' emphasis on

numerus clausus as a challenge to extant legal categories based on the concern that "the state's ordering
of property rights carried inherently distributional consequences"). I describe this as the central normative
concern, because a separate descriptive concern has been raised regarding whether the conceptualist
accounts, and particularly the emphasis on numerus clausus, accurate describes the phenomenon of
property. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 380 (2002) (faulting an
explanatory account of the principle for failing "to explain why property law is more restrictive than
contract law"); Joseph W. Singer, Democratic Estates: PropertyLaw in a Free and Democratic Society,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1025, 1061 (2009) (arguing that the system of estates does not "result in
anything close to simplification or standardization of the package of rights that go along with ownership").
I have addressed this concern in some detail elsewhere. See Render, Complexity, supra note 8, at 108-09.
27 Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105,

1107 (2003) [hereinafter Smith, Language] ("The realists and their successors argue that many features
traditionally associated with formalism-from literalistic interpretation to standardization of property
under the numerus clausus principle-are nothing more than archaic relics.").
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avoids the pitfalls of formalism generally because the function of form restriction is
not to arrive at a correct or even a substantively justifiable classification of interests
in a given dispute, but rather to arrive at a classification. 28 Numerus clausus is first
and foremost a coordinating tool.29 In this sense, form restriction as a rule set shares
much in common with rules of etiquette, rules of language, or the rules of a game.3 o
Rather than reflecting or directing deep normative commitments about the
distribution of assets, form restriction primarily serves to sort interests into a finite
(and therefore manageable) set of categories." To maintain a finite set of categories,
numerus clausus must eliminate idiosyncratic property interests.3 2 In this light, form
restriction's success is measured not by the degree that it disallows unjust or
unjustifiable outcomes, but instead by the degree that it disallows novel outcomes.
The realist critique does not obtain in the specific context of form restriction in
property because formalism in property is about exclusion not inclusion. The
application of numerus clausus does not help a legal decision-maker arrive at a
single, uniquely justifiable judgment in a property dispute. Instead, it ensures that an
infinite array of idiosyncratic estates will be excluded.

' Render, Complexity, supra note 8, at 117 ("[N]umerus clausus' primary regulatory role is barring the

highly idiosyncratic property interest.").
' More specifically, numerus clausus is a coordination rule. A coordination rule can be described as a
rule which arises when it is everyone's best interest to have a regularity of behavior, but more than one
course of behavior (ifregularized) would serve equally well as another. David Lewis developed a helpful
example of a coordination rule with the now familiar example of driving on a particular side of the road.
DAVID LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 6 (1969). The primary purpose of such a rule is

coordinate behavior. Rather than prescribing a uniquely justifiable result, a coordination rule can be said
to be justified by the coordination function itself.
' These types of rules are often referred to as "conventions." A rich literature is directed at the
phenomenon of conventional rules. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56-57,256-57 (1961)
(discussing conventions as a type of social rule); LEWIS, supra note 29 (presenting an influential account
of conventional behavior); see also ANDREI MARMOR, SOCIAL CONVENTIONS (2009) (challenging
Lewis's account); Hilary Putnam, Convention: A Theme in Philosophy, 13 NEW LITERARY HIST. 1 (1981);
Elizabeth Anderson, Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of Social Norms, 29
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 170 (2000).
31 Render, Complexity, supra note 8, at 116 ("[Numerus clausus] maintain[s] a manageable taxonomy of

ownership options.").
Id at 85 ("[Tlhe primary function of numerus clausus is to eliminate highly idiosyncratic
property
interests.").
32

Id. at 116 (explaining that numerus clausus eliminates "a potentially infinite host of possible ownership
arrangements").
1
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By excluding these variables, numerus clausus fills the vital role of ensuring
that our property system is not overwhelmingly complex in the same way that the
rule that directs us to drive on the right rather than left side of the road fills the vital
role of ensuring that we do not collide with one another in our cars.3 4 Put simply,
numerus clausus serves as an organizational limit for what would otherwise be a
catastrophically complex system of property. In this way, numerus clausus serves as
the conceptual center of the legal concept of property, while simultaneously serving
as the lynchpin of any functional property system.
The third, and final, imperative of this piece is to illuminate the boundaries of
the conceptualist/non-conceptualist divide. Regardless of whether conceptualist
scholars are correct that numerus clausus represents a feature that meaningfully
distinguishes property, or non-conceptualist scholars like Thomas Grey are right that
property is not a coherent legal concept, the debate has grown increasingly less
35
productive in recent years. Recent work directed at the question has been hindered
36
by vague misapprehensions and unfounded assumptions.

For example, many commentators have taken the conceptualist/nonconceptualist debate to be a kind of "code" for political disagreements about
3
economic justice and property distribution. Too often objections raised by form
restriction skeptics reveal a concern that the principle could undermine progressive
distributive ends.

* See LEWIS, supra note 29, at 6.
3 Thomas C. Grey, The DisintegrationofProperty,in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69, 74 (J. Roland Pennock
& John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (arguing that "property ... is no longer a coherent or crucial category in
our conceptual scheme," and that, in fact, property "ceases to be an important category in legal and
political theory").
6
See, e.g., Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative PotentialofProgressiveProperty, 101 CALIF.
L. REV. 107, 108-10 (2013) (describing conceptual disagreements among property theorists in broad and
bluntly political terms and, particularly, characterizing "the Left" who care about helping "historically
marginalized groups," as distinguished from "conservatives" who, assumedly, do not).

See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 120-35 (1993) (comparing and
contrasting a "classically liberal" conception of property with a "neoconservative view of property"); see
also Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 743 (2009)
(articulating a list of "progressive"-as implicitly contrasted from "non-progressive"-statements about
property law); Munzer, Bundle Theory, supra note 12, at 268 ("A virtue of [bundle theory] is that it makes
few if any moral or political commitments .... The bundle theory I proposed can be used by many
different sorts of property scholars, whatever their moral or political views.").
3

" See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, What Happened, supranote 6, at 365 ("[T]hc motivation behind the realists'
fascination with the bundle-of-rights conception was mainly political. They sought to undermine the
notion that property is a natural right, and thereby smooth the way for activist state intervention in
regulating and redistributing property.").
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That fear, however, is misplaced. The question of whether property has a
conceptual center is quite distinct from the question of what (if anything) a
conceptual center dictates in terms of real-world outcomes. The principle itself is
neutral in terms of resource distribution. If conceptualists are right that numerus
clausus is doing important work in delineating the conceptual boundaries of
property, then the principle can just as readily be conscripted to progressive ends as
regressive ends. This Article provides an insider's guide and annotated mapping of
this heavily trod yet rarely understood terrane.
In sum, this Article adopts three positions: (1) that property is conceptually
distinct from other areas of law, and that it is numerus clausus that makes it distinct;
(2) while numerus clausus embodies a kind of formalism, it is the good kind of
formalism, not the bad (as in savaged by the American Realists) kind of formalism;
and (3) regardless of whether one agrees with the conceptual account of property, it
is important to clarify what that account is and to distinguish it from the confusion
that generally surrounds it.
This argument is presented in the following format. Part I introduces the
conceptualist/non-conceptualist divide and explicates the necessary point of
divergence between the positions. Part II discusses various anti-formalist critiques
as they are relevant to the conceptualist account of property. Part I demonstrates
how numerus clausus succeeds both in avoiding the pitfalls of formalism generally
and in effectuating form restriction. Finally, Part IV offers a conclusion.

I.

THE CONCEPTUALIST/NON-CONCEPTUALIST DIVIDE

The conceptualist/non-conceptualist divide has to do with whether "property"
is a legal concept that has criterial features. Criterial features are features that
distinguish entities that fall within the extension of the concept (i.e., things that
"count" as "property") from entities that do not. Conceptualists understand the
concept of "property" to include one or more criterial features. 9 Most commonly,
conceptualists understand "property" to necessarily include the principle of numerus
clausus, a common law rule that imposes a restriction on allowable forms of
ownership.' In contrast, non-conceptualists generally do not view form restriction

" Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 11, at 3 ("A central difference between contract and
property concerns the freedom to 'customize' legally enforceable interests.").
' See id Some identify various scholars' conceptions of "the right to exclude" as a (or the) primary
demarcation between the various conceptualist camps. See Rosser, supra note 36, at 108-09; Munzer,
Bundle Theory, supra note 12, at 266 (attributing the view that "the right to exclude" is a core property

value to Merrill and Smith).
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as a necessary or important (or in some versions, extant) feature of property or
property systems. 4 1 Moreover, some non-conceptualists have criticized the
42
conceptualist emphasis on numerus clausus as misplaced and unduly formalist. The
disagreement goes to the heart of what makes something a property entitlement (i.e.,
what "counts" as property) as opposed to another kind of legally protected interest.
The formalist mechanism that property conceptualists embrace is embodied in
the principle of numerus clausus, a common law rule that restricts the form of legally
43
cognizable ownership. Rather than permitting owners to transfer customized or
novel interests that are tailored to the parties' individual preferences, the rule of
numerus clausus restricts the form of cognizable interests to a set and finite menu of
possible interests."
A.

Form Restriction in Property

45
Property law is surprisingly formalist. Despite the fact that formalism as a
mechanism of legal decision-making is notoriously out of fashion," property law
resolutely clings to a method of classifying and enforcing ownership interests that is

41 See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 11, at 6 (stating that some scholars, "tend to react
to manifestations of the numerus clausus as if it were nothing more than outmoded formalism").
42

Id. at 6-7 (observing that scholars and judges seem to react to the principle as if it were formalist).

43 Davidson, supra note 9, at 1598 ("[P]roperty law recognizes only a limited and standard list of
mandatory forms.").
" Merrill & Smith, Interface, supra note 2, at 778 (describing numerus clausus as "legally mandated list
of immutable forms").
4s See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY 8 (2011) [hereinafter DAGAN, PROPERTY] (describing an
emphasis on the forms of property as "a nice illustration of classical formalism" that is subject to the legal
realist critique "of form obscuring substance"). There is more than one sense to the term "formalism" and
arriving at an "exact definition" of formalism is not easy. Morton White, The Revolt Against Formalism
in American Social Thought of the Twentieth Century, in 8 J. HIST. IDEAS 2, 133 (1947). It is used here to
refer of a method of decision-making that resolves legal conflicts applying rule-bounded extant categories.
" Martin Stone, Formalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

166 (2002) (observing that "formalism" has come to be used almost exclusively as a term of opprobrium);

Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) [hereinafter Schaucr, Formalism]
(observing that the word "formalism" generally connotes something negative); White, supra note 45
(positing that formalism as an analytic methodology was intellectually eviscerated by the cross

disciplinary "anti-formalist" revolt lead by thinkers such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Dewey,
Thorstein Veblen, and Charles Beard).
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remarkably categorical. 47 This system of classification of ownership interests
revolves around a fixed set of categories or "forms."' To be enforceable, a property
interest must fit within a recognized category, which include the fee simple, fee
simple defeasible, life estate, and leasehold, among others. 49
Property's attentiveness to form is puzzling to many.so Conventional wisdom
holds it to be a frustrating and anachronistic feature of property law.5 ' In prioritizing
the homogenization of interests, some significant normative considerations are
necessarily sacrificed. 52 Many an eye is rolled upon discovering the extremely subtle
linguistic differences that give rise to, for example, a fee simple subject to condition
subsequent versus a fee simple determinable, particularly when one realizes how
much turns on the distinctions." Estates change hands and ownership interests are
destroyed with the inadvertent use of the word "revert" rather than "reenter" or the
use of the permissive "may" rather than the mandatory "shall."' Even the off-handed

47 See Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in the
EndangeredSpeciesAct, 83 IND. L.J. 661,673 (2008) ("Property law . .. is strongly tied to the categorical,
rather than the utilitarian approach.").
48 Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note I1, at 3 (observing that the "basic" forms of real property

ownership include "the fee simple, the defeasible fee simple, the life estate, and the lease").
4 Id at 3 ("With respect to interests in land .. . the basic forms are the fee simple, the defeasible fee
simple, the life estate, and the lease."). This is not intended to be a comprehensive list, and reasonable
minds can disagree about what does and does not "count" as a property form.
' Davidson, supra note 9, at 1598, 1618 (describing the phenomenon of numerus clausus as a "puzzle"
and noting that "standardization has long proven challenging to predominant accounts of property").
' Of course many scholars have defended the utility or necessity of property forms. See, e.g., Davidson,
supra note 9, at 1600 (arguing that property forms serve to mediate pluralistic public and private values
in the context of ownership); Hansmann & Kraakman, supranote 26, at 380 (arguing that form restriction
in property serves a verification of rights function); Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 11
(arguing that property forms serve to reduce information costs in property transactions).
52 One such consideration is the autonomy value described as "liberty of contract." See Hanoch
Dagan,

The Craft ofProperty, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1568 (2003) [hereinafter Dagan, Craft] (observing that
freedom of contract is necessarily curtailed by strict adherence to numerus clausus).

s See, e.g., Marhrenholz v. County Bd. of Sch. Trs., 417 N.E.2d 138, 142 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding
that the statement "land to be used for school purpose only" gave rise to a fec simple determinable and
stating that "a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent would have arisen had the [grantor] given the
land upon the condition that or provided that it be used for school purposes [only]").

5 Id
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placement of a comma or the unintentional ordering of clauses can seem to
dispossess one owner while supplying another owner with a windfall."
The common law rule that orchestrates property law's fealty to form is usually
56
referred to as the principle of numerus clausus. The phrase "numerus clausus"
literally means "the number is closed."s" The principle of numerus clausus requires
that property interests conform to one of the existing forms of ownership." Unique
or customized property interests are prohibited." Should an owner attempt to convey
an individually-tailored interest, courts will convert it to a recognized interest.'
In such a case, adherence to the formal system of property forms seems to many
to be "a good example of the triumph of form over substance," often with intuitively
6
unappealing consequences. 1 Basic subsistence and human dignity frequently hang
in the balance. Consider the following example. A pro se testator leaves a handwritten will that states:
I, Jessie Lide . .. appoint my niece Sandra White Perry as executrix of my estate.
I wish Evelyn White [decedent's sister-in-law] to have my home to live in and not
62
to be sold.

The language of the conveyance does not conform to any of our recognized forms of
ownership. Did Mrs. Lide intend to give Evelyn White a fee simple? This

ss

Id

56 See DAGAN, PROPERTY, supra note 45, at 8 (describing emphasis on forms in property law as "a nice

illustration of classical formalism").
" Davidson, supranote 9, at 1598 (The name numerus clausus originates "from the civil law concept that
the 'number is closed."').
" Id at 1598 ("[P]roperty law recognizes only a limited and standard list of mandatory forms.").
9

Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supranote 11, at 3 ("'[I]ncidents of a novel kind' cannot 'be devised
and attached to property at the fancy or caprice of any owner."').
' Id. at 3 ("If [parties] attempt to customize a new type of interest, the courts will generally recast the
conveyance as creating one of the recognized forms.").
6' DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 184. Textbook editors tend to highlight these intuitions, noting,

for example, that the taxonomy of property forms delincates "distinctions that have, or should have, lost
their relevance." Id.
62

White v. Brown, 559 S.W.2d 938, 938 (Tenn. 1977).
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construction is undercut by testator's directive that the house not be sold." The
power to transfer is a feature of the fee simple estate.' On the other hand did
Mrs. Lide intend to give Mrs. White a life estate in the home-a construction that is
supported by the phrase "to live in?" 65 If so, it is peculiar that she did not name
Mrs. White's successor in interest. Under that construction, Sandra Perry-who
along with her mother Mrs. White lived with testator "as a family" in the home for
twenty-five years-would not inherit the home when Mrs. White died.' Instead, a
set of distant relatives who may or may not have been acquainted with Mrs. Lide,
Mrs. White, or the house, would take possession of the house upon Mrs. White's
death.67
When the resolution of a case like this turns upon a single word or phrase
inadvertently selected by a pro se testator in a hand-written will, property's
formalistic leanings can seem an affront to justice. Surely legal decision-making in
such a case should turn on the underlying substantive merits of the respective
claims-or better still: grantor's specific, if idiosyncratic, intention-rather than
testator's accidental linguistic approximation of one or another of the recognized
forms of ownership.
Yet, subtle linguistic choices and careful attention to form do have a substantial
impact on property rights. Despite the fact that formalism as a mechanism of legal
decision-making has been resoundingly criticized,'6 8 property law continues to
employ a method of classifying and enforcing ownership interests that is remarkably
categorical. 69

6 Id. (parsing the language of an ambiguous pro se will to determine whether grantor intended to create a
fee simple or a life estate).

' See, e.g., Percy Bordwell, Alienability andPerpetuitiesII, 23 IOWA L. REV. 1, 14 (1937) (alienability
is a characteristic of the fec).
61 559 S.W.2d at 938.

6 Id. at 939.
67

Id.

' See Stone, supra note 46, at 166 (noting that "Formalism" as a term has a uniformly negative
connotation).
I But see Avihay Dorfman, Propertyand Collective Undertaking: The PrincipleofNumerus Clausus, 61
U. TORONTO L.J. 467, 478 (2011) (arguing that "property law does not feature the categorical restriction"
in the way that conventional wisdom perceives).
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In practice, the principle of numerus clausus means that even if it is clear that
grantor intends to create a novel, idiosyncratic interest, grantor's intent will not be
given effect. For Mrs. Lide this means that even though it appears she intended to
create a fee simple (i.e., an estate that could theoretically go on forever) that is limited
by an obligation that it cannot be transferred by the grantee-that intent is ignored.
Lide can either grant White an estate that could last forever, or Lide can ensure that
White is not empowered to sell the house. But she cannot do both. The rule of
numerus clausus forces the court to choose between competing cognizable estates,
rather than allow Lide to create her own novel estate.
Further, in addition to thwarting justice, adherence to property forms is thought
to likewise inhibit private ordering in property transfers."o While contract law allows
71
for "an infinite range of promises the law will honor," property law enforces only
72
a limited list of ownership rights. Contract law's sensitivity to individual preference
73
is generally believed to promote efficiency in the use and distribution of resources.
74
In contrast, numerus clausus would seem to hinder that mechanism of efficiency.
Given these (seemingly fair) criticisms of numerus clausus, it is not surprising
that the principle serves as the focal point for the criticism that property law is unduly
formalist or that property law employs "formalism" as a method of legal decision75

making.

One of the chief objections to numerus clausus stems from the fact that the
principle appears to require the slavish and mechanical application of a rule, without
76
regard to the substantive merits of the claims at hand. On this view, the principle
can fairly be characterized as formalist and, worse still, its formalism is thought to

70 Davidson, supra note 9, at 1598.
1 Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supranote 11, at 3.
72 Davidson, supra note 9, at 1598.
7

1Id

at 1619.

74 Id at 1619-22 (describing the concern that numerus clausus causes inefficiencies).

s See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note II, at 6 (stating that "[s]cholars and judges
tend to react to manifestations of the numerus clausus as if it were nothing more than outmoded
formalism").
See Dagan, Craft, supra note 52, at 1528. The term "mechanical jurisprudence" as a criticism of
formalist legal decision-making originated in Roscoe Pound's Mechanical Jurisprudence,8 COLUM. L.
REV. 605 (1908).
76
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favor existing and/or entrenched distributions of property interests.7 7 Further, to
many, it is a classic example of an "empty" formalism-ruleness for ruleness' sakeserving no substantial or discernible purpose.7 8 Still others wonder whether numerus
clausus is capable of producing the result that it purports to produce: namely form
restriction in property.79 This concern is particularly keen in light of the realist
skepticism about the capacity for rules to dictate unique outcomes.8 0
This is a significant point at which conceptualists and non-conceptualists views
diverge: whether numerus clausus is an anachronistic feature of property law, a form
of empty formalism that emphasizes all the wrong aspects of decision-making in the
distribution of assets; or whether, as conceptualists contend, numerus clausus is a
central, criterial feature of property that distinguishes it from other areas of
regulation. A careful consideration of this disagreement follows.

B.

The ConceptualistClaim

Predictably, there is no one conceptualist account of "property." Instead, there
are several distinct accounts of "property" that operate from the premise that
"property" can be understood as a coherent legal practice-and, importantly, as
distinguishable from other legal practices-insofar as it is a practice that embodies
one or more criterial features.
This claim is often made in opposition to the claim originally made by Thomas
Grey in 1980 that, "property ... [is] no longer a coherent or crucial category in our
conceptual scheme" and that, in fact, property "ceases to be an important category in
legal and political theory."' Of course, one need not be a conceptualist to disagree
with this claim. Grey has also been challenged on this point by those who do not
identify themselves as conceptualists.82 For example, Stephen Munzer, originator of

n See, e.g., Dagan, Craft, supra note 52, at 1528 (describing as formalist the application of numerus
clausus as a decision rule in actual cases).
Schaucr, Formalism, supra note 46, at 510. The term "ruleness" was coined by Frederick Schaucr in
the context of describing "decision-making according to rule" as the "heart" of formalism.
7

' Dorfman, supra note 69, at 478 ("[I]t is roundly acknowledged that private persons can 'almost always'
achieve whatever it is that they initially aim to achieve through manipulating the existing forms of property
rights, without being forced to tailor a novel form.").
a See, e.g, Singer, supra note 26, at 1024 (describing the estate system as "disturbing to modem

sensibilities").
81 See, e.g., Grey, supra note 35, at 81.
8 See, e.g., STEPHEN MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 31-36 (1990).
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the bundle-of-sticks theory (which is the predominate non-conceptualist account of
property), has also described Grey's claim as "unsound" and "overdrawn and
confused.""
Yet, Grey's description of property law as simply the sum of a collection of
rules that bear no coherent relationship to one other provides an antithesis to the
conceptualist thesis." While conceptualist accounts vary in their understanding of
what it is, exactly, that renders property coherent, conceptualists disagree with the
85
proposition that property law lacks coherence as a category of legal regulation. It
is likewise true that conceptualist accounts vary in the degree to which they
understand the doctrine to be coherent and/or unified.8 6 Nonetheless, a consideration
of what might be understood to be the "core" conceptualist claims along these lines
follows.
1.

Coherence

Property conceptualists adopt the position that "property" is a coherent
category and/or legal concept." For conceptualists, this coherence issues from the
fact that the legal concept of "property" is defined-in the sense of being

3

8 1 d at 31 (stating also that Grey's claim "seems to stand directly in the path of" Munzcr's own argument
regarding Munzer's conception of property as a bundle-of-sticks).

" See Henry E. Smith, Propertyas the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REv. 1691, 1691-92 (2012) ("But if
legal realism and its progeny insisted on anything, it was that property is not about things. According to

this conventional wisdom, property is a bundle of rights and other legal relations availing between persons.
Things form the mere backdrop to these social relations, and a largely dispensable one at that. Particularly
with the rise of intangible property, so this story goes, the notions of ownership and property have become
so fragmented and untethered to things that property is merely a conclusion, a label we affix to the cluster
of entitlements that result from intelligent policymaking. By contrast, according to the realist and
postrealist conventional wisdom, the traditional baselines provided by property law not only were
undertheorized and underjustified, but also represented a pernicious superstition and an obstacle to clear
thinking and progressive remaking of the social order. An inclination to take traditional property baselines
seriously can then be dismissed as a failure to get with the program and a reflection of lack of
sophistication or a partiality for entrenched interests.").
8 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 2097, 2105
n.26 (2012) ("Much of this debate is couched in terms of whether there is a 'core' to property and, if so,
whether it has anything to do with exclusion.").
' Henry Smith, for example, has described property as having some formal aspects and other aspects that
are not formal. Smith, supra note 84.
7 For a discussion of how concepts are rendered coherent by their limiting criteria, see Meredith M.
Render, Boundaries: Introduction to the Meador Lectures on Boundaries, in MEADOR LECTURES ON
BOUNDARIES (2014) [hereinafter Render, Boundaries], http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract

id=2321341.
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distinguished from other areas of regulation-by one or more criterial features. 8 The
phrase "criterial feature," as it is used here, is intended to connote a feature that both
distinguishes property from other areas of legal regulation and, to some degree,
unifies the doctrine.89
For some conceptualists, that criterial feature may be the right to exclude." For
others-and this is the position advanced here-the sole criterial feature of property
is the phenomenon of form restriction." Some conceptualists seem to be positing
that both form restriction and the right to exclude are criterial.Y Still others seem to
be identifying other criterial features."
As noted above, I embrace the position that form restriction is a criterial feature
in property. Insofar as form restriction is criterial, we should expect to see form
restriction in each instantiation of the legal concept of "property." It is in this sense
that form restriction renders the legal concept of "property" coherent. Form
restriction shapes each instantiation of the legal concept of "ownership." In turn, the
legal concept of "ownership" is, in one way or another, the subject or predicate of
every other rule of property law. Numerus clausus structures ownership, and
ownership's ambit is coextensive with the doctrine.

" Id. at 4 ("The coherence of every concept that we hold depends upon its limitation. To be coherent a

concept must encompass a set of criteria that distinguishes the concept from other concepts. The concept
of 'green,' for example, would have no content if anything could be fairly described as green and nothing
could be excluded from it.").
' In using the term "criterial" here, I am not making a claim about what does or does not "count" as
positive law. For example, if ajudge rejected the rule of numerus claususand declined to employ it, that
decision would still "count" as law insofar as it otherwise met the criteria for what counts as "law" (e.g.,
it comported with the rule of recognition and so forth), even though the decision did not comport with our
legal concept of "property." It would simply be a poorly decided case.
' Thomas W. Merrill, The Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998) [hereinafter Merrill, Exclude]
("Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have property.").
9

1, for one, am committed to this position. Render, Complexity, supra note 8.

* Thomas Merrill, for example, has been understood to adopt this position. See Merrill, Exclude, supra
note 90, at 730.
' J.E. Penner, The "Bundle ofRights"Pictureof Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 742 (1996) ("The right
to property is the right to determine the use or disposition of an alienable thing in so far as that can be
achieved or aided by others excluding themselves from it, and includes the right to abandon it, to share it,
to license it to others (either exclusively or not), and to give it to others in its entirety.").
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It is important to be clear that I am not making the claim that form restriction
4
explains or even informs the content of every rule of property law. For example,

form restriction does not explain why property law allocates the risk to buyer when

there is a catastrophic loss (caused by, say, a fire that destroys Blackacre) between
the execution of the contract for sale of real property and the delivery of the deed.
The rule could just as easily be otherwise (seller bears the risk of loss). Form
restriction has nothing to say about which rule is appropriate.
By way of contrast, consider Jules Coleman's conceptualist account of tort.
Coleman claims that "tort law is best understood in terms of a conception of
corrective justice." Coleman claims that corrective justice is embodied in the
96
practice of tort law and also explains the practice of tort law. In his view, corrective
justice explains why the rules of tort contain the specific content that they do-why
one choice is made instead of another. For Coleman, corrective justice unifies the
97
content of tort doctrine.

Numerus clausus does not unify the content of property doctrine. Aside from
preventing a catastrophic complexity which would destroy our capacity for a
property system at all (which is nothing to sneeze at), numerus clausus does little
more than distinguish ownership interests from other types of private law interests.
In this light, the claim made here is not a strong claim of coherence, as compared,
98
say, to those that Coleman has made about tort. But it is a claim about the way in
which even disparate aspects of property doctrine are related to one another through
the structure of ownership that is dictated by the principle.
While emphasizing the relative modesty of the coherence claims made here, it
may be helpful to clarify that I am also not making the claim that form restriction
causes property law to contain the content that it contains. Form restriction does not
cause, for example, the implied warranty of habitability. The claim of coherence is
not a causal claim.

" In fact, it may be the case that the only rule that numerus clausus informs is the rule that ownership
must assume a recognized form.
95 JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL

THEORY 4 (2001).

9 Id at 10.
97 Id

9 Id
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I am not even making the claim that form restriction necessarily results in the
particular forms that we have, or that the forms that we have are the "right" or optimal
number of forms to have. Numerus clausus is indifferent to whether we should have
a dynasty trust or three separate defeasible estates. The singular commitment of the
principle of numerus clausus is to prohibit the creation of novel ownership
arrangements by private parties." This does not mean that the list of cognizable
interests is intractable or ossified. The principle merely ensures that the power to
create idiosyncratic or novel interests is reserved for collective-rather than
individual-action.' From time to time, legislatures will add or remove interests
from the slate of cognizable forms. The fee tail, for example, has been legislatively
eliminated in a majority of U.S. states.10' On the other hand, a dynasty trust is a
relatively new interest that is recognized in an increasing number of jurisdictions.102
Instead, my claim is that form restriction in property is necessitated by the
intrinsic problem of complexity in property. Form restriction is a necessary feature
of not only our property regime, but of any property regime. Ownership of tangible
objects must assume a limited set of forms to avoid the creation of a catastrophically
complex system of property. As I have explained in greater detail elsewhere, this risk
of catastrophic complexity is unique to property, and as such, the necessity of
numerus clausus is unique to property. We could (and may) find form restriction in
other areas of regulation, say, for example, in contract, but it is uniquely necessitated
by each instance in which we are regulating human interactions with material objects.
Further, form restriction is a criterial feature of property because of this unique
connection between owning objects and complexity. In this way, we can distinguish
what does and does not "count" as property by identifying whether the instantiation
in question conforms to the rule of numerus clausus. It is in this way that the principle
structures ownership and renders the doctrine coherent.

* Render, Complexity, supra note 8, at 94.
"nSee Dorfman, supra note 69, at 483 ("[Numerus clausus] is the negative aspect of the broader notion
that the forms of property rights ought to be creatures of collective undertaking-viz, public legislation.").
.o. John Hart, "A Less Proportionof Idle Proprietors": Madison, Property Rights, and the Abolition of

Fee Tail, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 170 (2001) ("Abolishing fee tail was part of a legislative program
supported by Madison as well as Jefferson.").
&

'" Lucy A. Marsh, The Demise of Dynasty Trusts: Returning the Wealth to the Family, 5 EST. PLAN.

COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 23, 24 (2013) ("Recently, a flurry of state legislation has made it possible for an
individual to create a long-term private trust, called a Dynasty Trust.").
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This claim about the relationship between complexity and property, which I
have described as the complexity thesis, is supported by the fact that the principle of
0
numerus clausus appears to be a universal feature of property systems. All postfeudal property systems seem to embrace a system of limited property forms that are
defined by the state.'" This fact presents the question: why is form restriction
universal?As Nestor Davidson has observed: "this transcendence suggests that there
05
must be some overriding structural reason" for property form restriction.'
Complexity is the overriding structural feature of property that necessitates
numerus clausus.'" The problem of complexity is the central feature of any system
of property.1 07 This is because certain ontological features of tangible objects render
our property systems inherently complex. 08 First, tangible objects are necessary to
human survival. Every single one of the seven billion human beings presently on the
Earth must interact with multiple tangible objects every day in order to survive. Also,
real property and other tangible objects have the potential to outlast both the
ownership arrangements that we create and the human beings that created them.'
These factors taken together render tangible objects uniquely alienable and
vulnerable to successive ownership arrangements."i 0 If each of those ownership
arrangements was subject to customization, our property system would rapidly

103 Davidson, supra note 9, at 1600 ("Versions of the numerus clausus are found in Roman law and recur

throughout the history of feudal and post-feudal English common law. Likewise, some form of a standard
list appears in disparate modem civil law and common law systems throughout the world.").
'

Id. at 1600 ("[P]roperty interests almost always coalesce around forms defined by the state.").

"s Id at 1600. By way of contrast, we do not see analogous form restriction in the context of other legally
enforceable interests, such as contract interests, for example. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supranote 26,
at 380 (querying why form restriction does not appear in contract law).
1o6 Render, Complexity, supranote 8.

107 1d at 135-43.
' Id I would here reiterate a point I have made in previous work that I have developed my account of
property solely in the context of tangible objects of property. I have not considered non-tangible property
interests-for example, copyright interests. I am, as of yet, agnostic as to whether the same legal concept
of "property" protects intangible property interests, or, if, as some have suggested, another concept or
legal phenomenon is (or should be) at work. See, e.g., Avihay Dorfman & AssafJacob, Copyrightas Tort,
12 THEORETICAL INQUIRtEs L. 59, 96 (2011) (arguing that "the considerations that support a strict form
of protection for tangible property rights do not call for a similar form of protection when applied to the

case of copyright").
1" Render,

Complexity, supra note 8, at 140-42.

110 Id
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become so complex that it would ultimately cease to function."' Formalism in the

form of numerus clausus serves to prevent this worst-case-scenario of overwhelming
complexity.1 12 There may be a better way to grapple with the problem of complexity
inherent in ownership, but if there is, we have yet to find it.
Thus, in property, the coherence claims tend to be more modest and
circumspect than concepts in some other doctrinal areas."' Property doctrine is, by
all accounts, a diverse doctrine, encompassing a wide range of issues, interests,
objects, and subjects. In asserting that this diverse field is coherent, the conceptualist
claim is only that numerus clausus structures ownership and ownership is
coextensive with the doctrine.
2.

Unity

If the conceptualist account is correct, that "property" entails a criterial feature,
then we would expect to see that feature in every recognized instantiation of the legal
concept of "property." It is in this way that the criterial feature unifies the doctrine."14
Now it may be that some conceptualists go further than others in the claim that
the criterial features of property unify the doctrine. For example, Merrill and Smith
have been read by some as making broader claims of unity than the rather
circumspect claim-advanced here-that a criterial condition unifies the field of
property insofar as the criterion is present in each instantiation of the concept of
property. Stephen Munzer, for one, has read Merrill and Smith as seeking "to impose
more unity on property than any other casebook in its field by putting the right to
exclude front and center and by leading students through diverse areas of property
law to search for the maximization of exclusion-efficiency.""' In this criticism,

". Id. at 82 ("In the absence [numerus clausus], the normative commitments that comprise our rights and
duties with respect to the tangible objects in the world would rapidly grow so complex as to overwhelm
our capacity to understand them.").
112 Id at 130 ("The primary function of numerous clausus is to avoid a worst-case scenario: a property
system that is completely overwhelmed by relevant information.").
11' Cf COLEMAN, supra note 95, at 9-10 (making a stronger claim for conceptual coherence in the context
of the legal concept of "tort"), with John Gardner, What is Tort Law for? Part1. The Place of Corrective

Justice, 30 LAW & PHIL. 1, 2-6 (2011) (challenging, to some degree, Coleman's coherence claim).
114 Assumedly, this is a less robust notion of unification than the notion referred to by Stephen Munzer's

query: "What does it mean to say that property is a 'unified subject'? Merrill and Smith seem to mean that
some concept ... or some principle ... explains why property law has a coherent structure." Munzer,
Bundle Theory, supra note 12, at 271.
"s

Id
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Munzer seems to read Merrill and Smith as claiming that property rules are coherent
(and the doctrine is unified) because property rules encourage efficiency through the
robust and uniform use of the right to exclude.
Were this reading of Merrill and Smith accurate (and I do not think that it is),
then it could be said that Merrill and Smith are making a deeper claim about the legal
concept of "property": namely that "property" is rendered coherent by reference to
the principle (and/or value) of efficiency because property doctrine both embodies
and is explained by the value of efficiency."' That is to say, that the value and/or
principle of efficiency serves to explain the doctrine of property, in much the way
that Jules Coleman has argued that tort law embodies the principle (or value) of
117
corrective justice and that tort law is also explained by corrective justice.
I do not take Merrill and Smith to be making this deeper claim about the values
and/or principles that explain property doctrine. For example, in their work on
numerus clausus, I do not understand Merrill and Smith to be making strong
8
efficiency claims to account for the presence of the principle." Yet, they clearly
understand the principle of numerus clausus to be a central feature of property."I It
would be peculiar for Merrill and Smith to identify numerus clausus as one of the
salient features of property (and a feature that distinguishes property from contract),
yet not make strong efficiency claims to explain its presence in the doctrine, if it
were the case that their account of property ultimately depended upon the notion that
property law is unified and/or rendered coherent by reference to the principle of
efficiency.
Nonetheless, despite my skepticism of the point itself, it is important to raise
the point, because this understanding of Merrill's and Smith's account of property
seems to be animating some of the less careful treatment of the conceptualist project
as a whole. Much of the less careful treatment of their work (whether it assumes the
form of a critique or an accolade) seems to embark from the premise that to be a
conceptualist is to assume that the value of efficiency either explains or justifies

..6 Munzer scems to suggest as much, stating that Merrill and Smith's casebook "lead[s] students through
diverse areas of property law to search for the maximization of exclusion-efficiency." Id.
" COLEMAN, supranote 95, at 9.

"" For example, Merrill and Smith do not claim that numerus clausus reduces information (or
measurement) costs to the fullest extent possible, only that costs are reduced. Merrill & Smith, Numerus
Clausus, supra note I1, at 8.
119 Id at 3 (describing numerus clausus as "a central difference between contract and property").
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property law. 120 This assumption seems to be an extrapolation from Merrill and
Smith's emphasis that numerus clausus reduces information costs. 121 However,
assuming this to be true, it does not follow that property law either is or ought to be
unified by the principle or value of efficiency to the exclusion of other values or
principles. It is only to say that numerus clausus is not an example of "empty"
formalism insofar as it serves a desirable end. In this way, the Merrill and Smith
account offers an explanation of the rule of numerus clausus that challenged the then
widely-held account that numerus clausus was an "archaic relic." 22
Moreover, even if it were the case that a given conceptualist made the claim
that efficiency provided the best explanation for property law as it is currently
comprised, it would not follow that to be a conceptualist is to necessarily make the
same claim about the essential or salient or criterial features of property.
Conceptualists are unified in their understanding that the legal concept of "property"
embodies one or more criterial features. Conceptualists are not unified in their
understanding of which features are criterial.123 Similarly, conceptualists who agree
about which features are criterial may still offer differing explanatory accounts of
the criterial feature.
By way of example, my own account of "property" departs from Merrill's and
Smith's account insofar as they understand the right to exclude to be a "core" feature
of property. 124 On the other hand, my account converges with the Merrill and Smith
understanding that numerus clausus is criterial. 12s But even in finding agreement
with them that numerus clausus is criterial, I make no primary claims about

120 See, e.g., Rosser, supra note 36, at 109.
12 Mrrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 11, at 8 ("The existence of unusual property rights
increases the cost of processing information about all property rights .. . Standardization of property rights
reduces these measurement costs.").

122 Smith, Language, supra note 27, at 1107.
123 For example, as stated above, some conceptualists understand the right to
exclude to be criterial, while
others do not.

Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality ofProperty, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1849, 1850
(describing the right to exclude as a "core aspect" of property).
124

125 See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 11, at 3 ("A central
difference between contract
and property concerns the freedom to 'customize' legally enforceable interests .... The law of property
is very different in this respect. Generally speaking, the law will enforce as property only those interests
that conform to a limited number of standard forms.").
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26
Instead, I offer a distinct explanation of the
information costs or efficiency.1
phenomenon of numerus clausus based entirely on the problem of complexity in

property.
Yet, we are all conceptualists in that we all understand there to be a criterial
feature of property that distinguishes it from other areas of regulation. To understand
property through the lens of conceptualism is not to embrace any one notion of the
unifying feature of property law; it is only to understand property law to have a
unifying feature. In this light, it seems difficult to fathom why the moniker of
"conceptualist" in property discourse has come to be understood as code for
"conservative," especially among scholars who have only tangentially engaged the
work.

C.

Conceptualism as an ExplanationofPositive Law

Having outlined the main points of convergence among contemporary property
conceptualists, it may be helpful to further refine these claims by disaggregating
them from some common confusions about the conceptualist project. Two such
confusions are discussed below.

1.

Explanation Rather than Justification

A related point of clarification is also in order: in claiming that property law is
unified by the criterion of form restriction, conceptualists offer only an explanation
of, not ajustification of, the phenomenon of property. Jules Coleman has helpfully
offered the following succinct description of the difference between explanations and
justifications:
There is an important and familiar distinction between theoretical explanations
and theoretical justifications. While both can illuminate or deepen our
understanding, explanations do so by telling us what the nature of a thing is, or by
telling us why things are as they are; by contrast, justifications seek to defend or
legitimate certain kinds of things-for example, actions, rules, courses of conduct,
27
practices, institutions, and the like.1

use the qualifier "primary" here because my account acknowledges that Merrill's and Smith's
information cost thesis is consistent with my complexity thesis. Merrill's and Smith's thesis may be
descriptively accurate, but the complexity thesis offers the better explanation of the phenomenon of
126

numerus clausus. "Explanations are regulated by norms of descriptive and/or predictive accuracy" and
the complexity thesis explanation of numerus clausus fares better by these and other meta-theoretical
standards of explanation. See COLEMAN, supra note 95, at 3.
1

27

Id.
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Conceptualist accounts aim to explain the practice of property law. They do not, for
the most part, aim to justify it. Now, some individual conceptualists may also seek
to justify the doctrine or parts of the doctrine by reference to criterial conditions or
other, extrinsic, values or norms. But justification is not a necessary aspect of a
conceptualist account.

2.

Positive Law Versus Natural Law Conceptualism

A further distinction should be made among conceptualist accounts. It is
important to distinguish positive law conceptualism from natural law
conceptualism.1 28 Positive law conceptualism presents an account of an area of law
based, predictably, on positive law (meaning decisional law, statutes, et cetera).1 29
Drawing from these sources of positive law, a positive law conceptualist may make
claims about a principle that is embodied in the positive law and/or explains the
positive law.' 3 0
My account of the legal concept of "property" is a positive law conceptualist
account. I make the positive law claim (both here and elsewhere) that numerus
clausus is embodied in the doctrine.13 1 I also claim that numerus clausus can be best
explained in light of the risk of complexity in property. The complexity thesis
explains the presence of numerus clausus in the doctrine, in light of ontological facts
about material objects and ownership. It is a two-pillared, yet mutually reinforcing
analysis: numerus clausus distinguishes property because of ontological facts about
owning; ontological facts about owning explain numerus clausus.
My reference to ontological features of tangible objects may invite a natural
confusion as to whether I am seeking to invoke a natural law method of analysis. I
am not. I do not claim that numerus clausus is an inherent or inexorable aspect of the
enterprise of "property"-although I do believe that in the absence of numerus
clausus there is little to distinguish property rights and obligations from inpersonam
private law rights and obligations.1 32 Nonetheless, theoretically, one could
(nominally) have a property system that lacked form restriction; it would just be a

.12
Id at 4 n.3.
1

29

130

d
d

131 I do not mean to suggest that I am alone in making this claim. Merrill and Smith first identified
this
insight, although they offered a distinct means of explaining the presence of numerus clausus within the
doctrine. Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note I1.
32

Render, Complexity, supra note 8.
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very poor, very complex, and very short-lived system. Its brief tenure would,

nonetheless, "count" as law until another instantiation of positive law supplanted it.
In contrast, natural law conceptualism understands the unifying or criterial
feature of a body of law not to issue from the positive law itself, but instead from the
application of a moral norm that is or reflects an a priori aspect of the enterprise
itself. Under this methodology, an instantiation of law that fails to embody the
criterial feature ceases to "count" as law at all. Were I to adopt a natural law account
that numerus clausus is criterial to property, I would need to connect numerus
clausus to a moral norm (or understand it to be, in and of itself, a moral norm (which
it is not) that is an a prioi aspect of property law. However, that is not at all the
argument that I have made.
Thus, the question of whether numerus clausus is a criterial feature of property
law serves as a primary point of divergence between conceptualist and nonconceptualist accounts of property. Moreover, the disagreement about numerus
clausus is both descriptive and normative. The descriptive disagreement centers on
skepticism about whether numerus clausus serves the functions ascribed to it by
conceptualists (e.g., whether it succeeds in distinguishing property law from other
areas of regulation, such as contract).
A second aspect of the conceptualist/non-conceptualist disagreement about
numerus clausus is more normative than descriptive. This aspect of the disagreement
centers on the concern that nwnerus clausus (or, at least, emphasis on numerus
clausus) is duly formalist. This concern is considered in detail below.
H.

THE UNUSUAL FORMALISM OFNUMERUS CLAUSUS

To engage in a discussion of formalism in property, it is helpful to first lay bare
34
our terms.m"I The term "formalism" is notoriously difficult to define.' "Formalism"
is a term that tends to evoke strong reactions even among those who disagree as to
its meaning.' 35 Frederick Schauer has observed:

133 The term "realists" as used here refers both to the set of 1920s era American Legal Realist thinkers

such as Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, Max Radin, as well as more contemporary realist scholars such as
Hanoch Dagan and Thomas Grey. See DAGAN, PROPERTY, supranote 45, at xviii ("Over the years I have

become increasingly conscious of the debt my understanding of property owes to the legacy of legal
realism.").
" Schauer, Formalism, supra note 46, at 509-10 ("[There is] scant agreement on what it is for decisions
in law, or perspectives on law, to be formalistic.").
135 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 332 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999) (describing the "caricature of formalism in contemporary legal
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The pejorative connotations of the word "formalism," in concert with the lack of
agreement on the word's descriptive content, make it tempting to conclude that
"formalist" is the adjective used to describe any judicial decision, style of legal
thinking, or legal theory with which the user of the term disagrees.1 6

"

Yet, the term "formalism" does have a descriptive content.1 37 By most accounts,
formalism is a theory or method of adjudication in which law is perceived to be
"rationally determinate." 3 8 Law is rationally determinate "if the class of legal
reasons [which includes positive law, rules of interpretation, and principles of
reasoning] justifies one and only one outcome to a legal dispute" without appeal to
the facts or (as some would have it) context of the case at bar.3
When used to describe a method for making decisions, it is often thought to
describe decision-making in the absence of judicial discretion." This idea is
sometimes described as "mechanical" decision-making, although apart from being
evocative, the term is not especially helpful and some accounts eschew this
description.' 4' In the formalist account, there is no opportunity for juridical resort to

scholarship, where formalism ... serves principally as a 'loosely cmployed term of abuse"'). Weinrib
takes the term "formalism" to connote a theory of legal justification that is focused on the analysis of legal
relationships with respect to their "necessary conditions, their internal principles of organization, and their
presuppositions." Id. at 333.
"'Schauer, Formalism,supra note 46, at 510; see also Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism,and Realism,
99 COLUM. L. REv. 1138, 1144 [hereinafter Leiter, Positivism]("'Formalism' is .. . frequently used as an
epithet, and thus inspires unflattering, and sometimes colorful, characterizations.").
131 Schaucr, Formalism, supra note 46, at 510 ("There does seem to be descriptive content in the notion
of formalism, even if there are widely divergent uses of the term."). Henry Smith has described formalism
as relative "indifference to context" and stated that a rule system is "more formal the less its interpretation
or application depends on context." Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U.
PA. L. REv. 2097, 2105 (2012).

"'Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 228, 265
(Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) [hereinafter Leiter, Legal Realism] ('The law on some point is rationally
indeterminate when the 'class of legal reasons' . . . is insufficient to justify a unique outcome on that
point.").
139

Leiter, Positivism, supra note 136, at 1145.

140 Stone, supranote 46, at 169 (describing this misperception of formalism and adding, "the implication
would be that, for a formalist, a judicial decision is never justified but, at best, excusable as a causally
determined effect").
141

Id at 169 ("[I]t seems implausible, if not comical" to imagine the formalist genuinely understands

decision-making to be "mechanical.").
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extra-legal norms or judgments about what would be just or fair in light of the
particular facts at bar.' 42
A.

The Ruleness ofNumerus clausus

When critics refer to formalism in property, they are generally referring to
courts' application of the principle of numerus clausus, which prohibits the creation
of idiosyncratic property interests. 143 Despite the simplicity of its core commitment,
numerus clausus has long been the focus of scrutiny and controversy regarding the
function and significance of the principle.'
It may be helpful to begin then with an illustration of how numerus clausus
be
understood to be formalist.
may
Prohibiting the private creation of idiosyncratic interests is numerus clausus'
sole achievement, but it is a significant achievement. 14 5 The principle restricts the
number of enforceable ownership arrangements that are possible in private
exchanges.'" It is a feature-indeed some believe it to be the sole feature-that
substantively distinguishes property from contract.1 47 If it were not for numerus

142 Leiter, Positivism,supra note 136, at 1145.
143 DAGAN, PROPERTY, supra note 45, at 8 (describing numerus clausus as "a nice illustration of classical
formalism").
" See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 11, at 8 (arguing that numerus clausus "stems
from the in rem nature of property rights," and serves to reduce information costs in property transactions);
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 26, at 373, 382, 416-17 (arguing that standardization in property
serves to "aid verification of the ownership of rights offered for conveyance"); Dagan, Craft, supra note
52, at 31 ("The numerus clausus principle, in other words, sustains the institutions of property as
intermediary social constructs through which law interacts with-reflects and shapes-our social
values."); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of PropertyLaw,

78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1669, 1730-39 (2003) (advancing the theory that various conceptions of objective
well-being serve as a justification for the numerus clausus principle); Davidson, supra note 9 (arguing
that the principle is a means by which property doctrine accommodates competing pluralist values);
Singer, supra note 26 (arguing that structural features of proper law, like numerus clausus, arc justified
or unjustified in light of the degree to which those features support democratic values); Dorfman, supra
note 69, at 467 (arguing that the principle of numerus clausus represents a moral commitment to
democratic self-government).
14' Render, Complexity, supra note 8, at 117 ("'Numerus clausus' primary regulatory role is barring the

highly idiosyncratic property interest.").
"nMerrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note I1, at 3 ("If [parties] attempt to customize a new type
of interest, the courts will generally recast the conveyance as creating one of the recognized forms.").
147 The principle itself reflects a deeper conceptual distinction between property and contract, as least
insofar as property law applies to tangible objects.
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clausus, we might think of our ownership arrangements as nothing more than a set
of in personam commitments.'4 In personam commitments, such as contracts, are
more or less infinitely amenable to individual tailoring. 4 9 If an exceedingly specific
or peculiar interest suits the needs of the parties to a contract, those parties can tailor
that interest within the terms of their contract and courts will enforce it. Within the
parameters of some broad proscriptions (e.g., unconscionability), parties to a contract
can sculpt and mold the interests they create to suit their individual needs, whims, or
fancy.1 50
However, this is not the case with property interests."' While property interests
may be subject to peculiar (and sometimes exceedingly peculiar) limitations on the
use of real property, ownership of real property is formally standardized within the
system of estates.1 5 2
In this light, if numerus clausus can be said to be formalist, it is because it
embodies a kind of "ruleness" where the imperative of the rule itself (instead of, for
example, the reasons for the rule, or other rules, or other facts)15 ' applies prescriptive
pressure with little regard to the context in which it is applied. 1 54 Indeed, Frederick
Schauer has described formalism as "decisionmaking according to rule."'5 In
Schauer's account, "[flormalism is the way in which rules achieve their 'ruleness'
precisely by doing what is supposed to be the failing of formalism: screening off
from a decision-maker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take
into account."'5 6
In other words, rules succeed, when they succeed, by limiting the universe of
variables that a decision-maker is permitted to consider in making a decision. In the

14 Merrill & Smith, Interface, supra note 2, at 776.
149 Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 11, at 3 ("The parties to a contract are free to be as

whimsical or fanciful as they like.").
1s0

Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supranote 11, at 3.

''

Id. at 2.

12 See Singer, supra note 26, at 1025 (observing that the principle of numerus clausus
does not prevent

land from being burdened with any number of "weird" conditions that defy "ordinary expectations").
'i Although Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo have persuasively made the case that the "rules" (or law

itself) are themselves sets of facts, so this may be a misleading contrast. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S.
Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769 (2003).
'" See Smith, Language, supra note 27, at 1112 (describing a rule system as formal to the degree it does
not rely upon context).

.ss Schauer, Formalism,supra note 46, at 510.
156 Id
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context of legal analysis, rules may fail or succeed in narrowing the universe of
variables that arise in the process of adjudicating a controversy.
With respect to numerus clausus, this ruleness may be manifest in several ways.
First, numerus clausus directs us to sift interests into categories, rather than solely
understanding the interest in light of grantor's intent. Grantor's intent is a factor in
determining the correct category, among competing categories of interests. Yet,
insofar as numerus clausus succeeds in directing us towards categories and away
from inquiry into the specific and perhaps idiosyncratic set of powers, rights,
obligations, and so forth that grantor intended to create, it has succeeded in screening
off a set of factors that a decision-maker would otherwise take into account.
Additionally, the categories themselves-the fee simple, life estate, leasehold,
so
forth-can also be understood to be products of the principle of numerus
and
clausus. In the absence of the rule, there would be no need to construct cognizable
"forms" of ownership. Each form of ownership in itself is likewise constituted with
criterial conditions-e.g., a fee simple is an interest with a potentially infinite
duration, that includes the right to transfer. In directing us towards these (and only
these categories), numerus clausus succeeds in eliminating a potentially infinite set
of variables regarding other potential ownership packages that might be transmitted
by a non-standardized conveyance.
For example, in the absence of numerus clausus, if an owner has in mind to
construct a complex set of conditions and powers with respect to an object she wishes
to transfer-say, for example, a car-a court, in seeking to enforce the interests
created would have to consider a greater number of variables. This is because
literally any combination of powers, rights, duties and obligations could be subject
to legal enforcement (assuming, of course, that they are not otherwise proscribed by
broad prohibitions, such as rules prohibiting discrimination or rules prohibiting
unreasonable restraints on alienation). A seller could convey an ownership
arrangement with respect to the car that is incredibly complex. An owner could
convey the right to drive a car on every third Thursday, while reserving the right to
transfer the car. In the same conveyance, the seller could impose a duty to care for
the routine maintenance of the car some of the time, and the power to terminate the
ownership arrangement should a woman become president, assuming the owner is
so inclined. In seeking to enforce this arrangement, a court would have to consider a
great number of variables that are omitted from consideration under numerus
clausus.
Form restriction then limits the number of variables that must be considered in
that it limits the number of forms that ownership can assume. In so doing, numerus
clausus limits the package of rights, duties, powers, and so forth that can attend a
single conveyance. This is not to say that numerus clausus prevents conditional
property interests. Numerus clausus allows conditional interests, and those
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conditions can even be highly idiosyncratic. However, the interest-i.e., the package
of powers, duties, rights, et cetera that is created with respect to the object in
question-cannot be idiosyncratic. The interest must assume a standardized form.
For example, a grantor might convey the following: "Blackacre to Adams, for
so long as red roses remain planted in the garden." Grantor has created a peculiar
limitation on Adam's (and his successors in interest) use of Blackacre: rather than
having plenary control over the content of the garden (or the freedom to eliminate
the garden altogether), Adam and his successors must use the garden in the manner
prescribed by Grantor. The condition is idiosyncratic, and it could easily be
characterized as the product of Grantor's individual whim or fancy. Yet, the interest
that Grantor has created in the conveyance-the estate-is not idiosyncratic. It is a
fee simple determinable.
We know that the estate that Grantor has created is a fee simple determinable
because we know it must be one of the recognized estates and it meets the criteria of
a determinable estate.' 57 Knowing that it is a determinable estate, we know that it
could, in theory, last forever, but that it might not."' If the determinable condition
comes to pass, the estate will end and Grantor's corresponding future interest will
automatically become possessory.is 9
A compliment of standard powers, limits, and obligations attend ownership of
a fee simple determinable.'" Once we have categorized the conveyance, a set of
broadly applicable rules bounding Adam's ownership of Blackacre necessarily
obtain. The rules that govern Adam's relationship to Blackacre are also applicable
across the whole class of interests that meet the criteria of the category of fee simple
determinable. The rules delimiting ownership of Blackacre are not created by nor are
they specific to this individual conveyance. Thus, our initial categorization of the
Blackacre conveyance leads to a set of nondiscretionary rules that regulate not only
our conveyance, but all such conveyances. If the conveyance is a fee simple
determinable, then X necessarily follows. The initial characterization seems to
compel a particular result. This is one of the facets of numerus clausus that is
frequently identified as formalist.
However, it is important to consider how we arrive at the initial
characterization. Adam's conveyance seems to represent a relatively "easy" case of

157 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 244-45.
58

1

Id.

59

1 Id
1M Id
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applying a single rule (i.e., "no novel forms of ownership are recognized") to the
uncomplicated facts of a straightforward conveyance. Nonetheless, there are, of
course, many rules that bear on the initial classification of this relatively
straightforward interest.
First, the rules of language bear on every legal question, including this one.
Second, legal rules that constitute the various estates-i.e., criterial rules that tell us
what "counts" as a fee simple determinable-play a central role here. Prior decisional
law has established a criterial rule that a determinable estate is created when grantor
intends to create an estate with an inherent durational limit. A second rule holds that
duration language signifies the intent to create such an estate. A third rule likewise
culled from prior decisional law tells us that the phrase "so long as" is thought to be
durational and thereby signifies a determinable estate. Only by applying these three
rules together (and the underlying rules of language which animates them) are we
able to reach the "easy" conclusion that a fee simple determinable is established.
Further, in the background of our criterial rules about what "counts" as a fee
simple determinable are other rules about when, how, and why we apply precedent,
what "counts" as binding precedent, and so on. Beneath these rules are rules about
what "counts" as law in the jurisdiction, the rules that constitute the jurisdiction, et
cetera.
So what work is numerus clausus doing amid the application of all these rules?
Primarily, numerus clausus directs a decision-maker to apply one set of rules rather
than another set in determining the distribution of the asset in question. Rather than
applying rules that govern the means by which we discern grantor's intent and the
rules that bound the various legally cognizable powers, rights, obligation, and so
forth that the conveyance purports to convey, we apply rules that govern the
constitution of a set list of cognizable estates. In the absence of numerus clausus, we
still apply sets of rules, they are just different sets rules.
Here enters a set of realist concerns regarding the formalism of numerus
clausus. On the one hand, if the ruleness of numerus clausus succeeds in precluding
a decision-maker from considering a set of variables, then the realist concern is that
the decision-maker is precluded from making use of important, appropriate, and
potentially outcome-determinant information. This concern is made worse, if one
adopts the perspective that numerus clausus itself serves no legitimate or discernible
end.
In the case of Mrs. Lide, for example, insofar as numerus clausus precludes the
decision-maker from considering the relative substantive merit of the potential
owners' claims, then numerus clausus may be causing the decision-maker to reach
an unjustifiable result.
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On the other hand, if numerus clausus lacks the adequate ruleness to limit the
set of variables the decision-maker takes into account, then emphasis on the
principle-and, in particular, articulation that numerus clausus compels a specific
analysis or result-merely serves to obscure the actual dynamics of decision-making
with respect to the distribution of an asset.1 6' A consideration of these concerns
follows.
B.

The Realist Critique ofNumerus clausus

The intellectual error of formalism as a method of legal decision-making is
fairly straightforward. Critics of formalism posit that it is simply not possible to
"mechanically" apply rules and thereby deduce conclusions without the aid of
reasons.'62 Rules are, by nature, broad prescriptions.' 6 Broad prescriptions applied
to concrete and particular facts cannot generate conclusions that are uniquely
justifiable with reference only to the rule.IM The heart of this insight is descriptive.
Rather than asserting that rules should not be applied without the intervention of
reasons, the criticism holds that rules cannot be applied without the intervention of
reasons.1 65 Thus, when a court claims to be employing a formalist method of
resolving a legal question, the actual decision-making dynamics of the court's
decision are obscured.1 66
To address the questions of whether and how property law may be understood
to be formalist (and/or conceptualists who emphasize the significance of numerus
clausus may be said to be formalists or formalistic), we must closely match realists'
objections about formalisms with the specific phenomenon of numerus clausus.

61 Smith, Language,supra note 27, at 1106.

Or more specifically, without the aid of nonlegal reasons. See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism:
Toward a NaturalizedJurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 278 (1997) [hereinafter Leiter, Rethinking]
("What the descriptive Formalist really claims is that judges are (primarily) responsive to legal reasons,
while the Realist claims that judges are (primarily) responsive to nonlegal reasons.").
16' FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 17 (1999) [hereinafter
SCHAUER, RULES] ("There are
no rules for particulars.").
162

" Instead, judges require "reasons" as a means of justifiably applying a rule. These reasons may be
limited to legal reasons (including, for example, prior cases, reasoning by analogy) rendering the outcome
legally justifiable. On the other hand, the reasons may include non-legal reasons, which reflects the realist
worry. See Leiter, Legal Realism, supra note 138, at 265.
65 See Leiter, Rethinking, supra note 162, at 278.
'6 H.L.A. Hart (critically) described this realist claim: "talk of rules is a myth, cloaking the truth that law
consists simply of the decisions of courts and the prediction of them." HART, supra note 30, at 136.
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Be assured, ours is not the first oar in these waters. The theses of this paper are
situated within a long-standing conversation within property theory about the nature
of property law generally and the significance, role, and function of numerus clausus
specifically. It is a conversation that can be traced back as least as far as the 1920s
and 1930s era legal realists, a cohort that includes thinkers like Karl Llewellyn,
Jerome Frank, Underhill Moore, Felix Cohen, Leon Green, Herman Oliphant, Walter
Wheeler Cook, Max Radin, and others. 16 7 The realists offered a critique of what was
sometimes described as "conceptualism," and other times called "formalism," both
of which roughly refers to the practice in legal decision-making of treating an extant
68
legal category as though it compelled a unique legal outcome.'
At the outset, it is perhaps helpful to note that realists were not engaged in
interrogating concepts.' 6 9 In many ways the realist project is indifferent to the
question that is central to those who are interested in the legal concept of
"property"-i.e., "what, if anything, distinguishes the legal concept of property from
other concepts?" Instead, the realists were concerned about the capacity of rules to
70
produce unique results.1

The realists famously expressed deep skepticism about the capacity of legal
rules (which include not only precedent and statute, but also the rules of
interpretation, doctrinal principles, logic inference and deduction, and so forth) to
produce unique results.' 7 ' Of course, to some degree this is a necessary
oversimplification-the realists advanced several distinct and nuanced varieties of
rule-skepticism.' 72 But for the purpose of this discussion it is sufficient to focus on
what Brian Leiter has described as the "core claim" of legal realism, which is the

17 Leiter, Rethinking, supra note 162, at 269 (describing this group as "everyone commonly thought to

be a Realist").
6'

See Davidson,supra note 9, at 1631 (describing Dagan's sclf-described realist analysis as "fruitfully

align[ing] with the Legal Realist project of challenging the formalism of extant legal categories").
'6 Leiter, Rethinking, supra note 162, at 270-72.
o Leiter, Legal Realism, supra note 138, at 265.
17' Leiter, Rethinking, supranote 162, at 295 ("[T]hc Realists claim that the law is rationally indeterminate
in the sense that the class of legal reasons-i.e., the class of legitimate reasons a judge may offer for a
decisiodoes not provide a justification for a unique outcome.").

172 Leiter, Legal Realism, supranote 138, at 265-74.
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claim that given that legal rules fail to compel unique results, judges respond
primarily to the stimulus of facts rather than legal stimulus of legal rules.1 73
To say that the realist critique of conceptualism or formalism has been well
received in the American legal academy is to understate. 174 Although it is always
perilous to generalize, it is safe to say that the realist critique continues to be a highly
influential, if not predominating, idea in the American legal academy.17 1 It is, of
course, a clich6 to say "we are all legal realists now."'7 6 However, there are pockets
within the American legal academy where the predominance of the realists' critique
of conceptualism remains, to some degree, contested. Legal philosophy, for example,
is such a pocket, and perhaps surprisingly, property theory is another. 7 7
Over the years, property theorists have periodically revived the conversation
between conceptualist understandings of property rights and various realist
perspectives.' 78 The most recent incarnation of interest in this discourse arose around
the turn of the millennium when Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill wrote a series of
articles about the significance of form restriction in property.1 79 Merrill and Smith
proposed that numerus clausus was a defining feature of property law and that form
restriction served certain specific functions within the doctrine, not the least of which
was to distinguish property interests from other types of privately created legal
interests.'8 s Other scholars responded."' Some have offered alternative accounts and

1' Leiter, Rethinking, supra note 162, at 277 ("The Realists, then, share a commitment to the view that in
deciding cases,judges respondprimarilyto the stimulus offacts of the case." (emphasis added)).
174 Id. at 267 (describing the influence of Legal Realism as "enormous").
75

s See Joseph William Singer, LegalRealism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465,467 (1988) ("All major current

schools of thought are, in significant ways, products of legal realism.").
176 See id at 467 ("To some extent, we are all realists now."); see also Gregory
S. Alexander, Comparing
the Two Legal Realisms-American and Scandinavian, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 131, 131 (2002) ('We are all

Realists now,' as the saying goes.").
1" See, e.g., Penner, supra note 93 (criticizing the "instrumental" view of property as explicated by the
"bundle of rights" account of property, and favoring instead a conceptualist account).
1" See, e.g., id.
9

" See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note I1; Merrill & Smith, Interface, supra note 2; Smith,

Language, supra note 27.
'

See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 11.
' See, e.g., Munzer, Bundle Theory, supra note 12 (criticizing Merrill and Smith's account); Hansmann

& Kraakman, supra note 26 (critiquing Merrill and Smith's thesis).
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explanations of numerus clausus, while others have disputed Merrill and Smith's
claims of its function, role, or significance.182
The realist perspective on numerus clausus is centrally tied to the realists'
18 3
Although formalism's
broader skepticism about formalism as a methodology.
deep-rooted intellectual flaw is thought to be manifest in a myriad of contexts,'" the
context that is most relevant to numerus clausus concerns an over-emphasis on the
form of legal rules."' When used in this context, "formalism" describes a specific
kind of decision-making that purports to rely solely on the imperative (or
"command") of a rule as the basis of a decision to the neglect of other possible bases,
such as the purpose of the rule, the reason for the rule, or other conflicting but equally
applicable rules.' 86
While formalism as a methodology-indeed, even as a system of
justification-has its defenders,' 8 7 by and large conventional wisdom has clustered
around the notion that the 1920s era American Legal Realists dealt an intellectual
deathblow to formalism.8" Brian Leiter summarizes the realist critique:
"Formalism" . . . held that judges decide cases on the basis of distinctly legal rules
and reasons, which justify a unique result in most cases . . .. The Realists argued
instead that ... courts really decide cases. . . not primarily because of law, but
89
based on their sense of what would be "fair" on the facts of the case.'

182 See,

e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 26 (challenging the information cost thesis).

..
3 See DAGAN, PROPERTY, supra note 45, at 8.
'" Stone, supra note 46, at 170-71 (identifying seven distinct situations that are identified as "formalist"

in the literature, of which emphasis on the form of a rule rather than its content is only one).
' This error is thought to be both a mistake of legal practice in which judges are "overly-rule bound" in
their decision-making and as a result are insensitive to the "aims and needs the law is meant to serve,"
and a mistake of theory in which the formalist believes that there are some instances in which rules may
be applied without reference to reasons. Stone, supra note 46, at 172-73.
116
1

Shauer, Formalism,supra note 46, at 513-14.
Cf Weinrib, supra note 135.

* See Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND

LEGAL THEORY 50 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005) [hereinafter Leiter,
American Realism].
"1 Id. at 50.

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195lawrevicw.2017.497
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

UNIVERSITY

PAGE

|474

OF

PITTSBURGH

|VOL.78

LAW

REVIEW

|2017

The realists posited that legal rules could not be the fulcrum of legal decision-making
because legal rules were indeterminate-at least in a class of "hard" cases.' Realists
pointed to the fact that positive legal rules (e.g., statute, precedent, and cannons of
interpretation) and accepted forms of legal reasoning (e.g., deduction and analogy),
often conflicted.' 91 For example, two accepted cannons of statutory interpretation
might point in opposite directions in a given case. As a result, in "hard" cases, more
than one outcome could be justified in light of applicable legal rules and accepted
forms of legal reasoning.'92
Thus, the first pillar of the realist critique involved what has come to be known
as the "indeterminacy thesis."l93 The term "hard" cases is typically associated with
Hart who argued that legal rules offered definitive answers to most cases (termed
"core" cases) while a smaller subset of cases occupied the penumbra of legal
reasoning,'" a point with which most realists agreed195
A second mainstay of the realists' general criticism of formalism concerned a
worry over judges' sense of (or, more cynically, articulation of) false constraint:
judges claimed to be obliged to take a certain action (e.g., strike down a labor law,
as in the infamous Lochner) because the law compels this outcome.' 9 6 The realist
critique purported to reveal the constitutive nature of judging-that in deciding
cases, judges were engaged in the act of constituting the very rules they claimed to
be constrained by within the case. Yet, this insight remained inconsistent with the

'9 See id at 53 ("Realists were especially concerned . . [with] that class of more difficult cases that
reached the stage of appellate review.").

'9 1 d at 5 1.
' Id at 50.
'9' There arc, actually, at least two indeterminacy theses (and more than one possible formulation of each
of these). The first thesis concerns the worry that legal rules are indeterminate due to an indeterminacy of
reasons. This thesis, which is the primary concern here, is explained infra. The second thesis worries that
whatever the compliment of accepted legal rules and reasons, those rules and reasons fail to satisfactorily
explain what causes a judge to make a decision. Jules Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity,

andAuthority, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 559-60 (1993).
194 HART, supra note 30, at 125-54.
'9 See Leiter, American Realism, supra note 188, at 52 ("The Realists were (generally) clear that their
focus was indeterminacy at the stage of appellate review, where one ought to expect a higher degree of
uncertainty in the law.").
" Schauer, Formalism, supra note 46, at 513-14.
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rhetoric of judges who generally declined to acknowledge that they were engaged in
a constitutive act. Frederick Schauer has described the trouble in the following way:
[Olne view of the vice of formalism takes that vice to be one of deception, either
of oneself or of others. To disguise a choice in the language of definitional
inexorability obscures that choice and thus obstructs questions of how it was made
1
and whether it could have been made differently. 9

Thus, one of the principle insights of the legal realist movement was that judges were
choosing among variously justifiable results rather than mechanically applying
rules.' 98

In the context of property, realist insights have been translated (and perhaps
mistranslated) into a broad skepticism that suspected that judges' personal and
political preferences favoring entrenched resource distributions (a preference
thought to be inherently conservative) were determining the outcome of decisions
rather than property forms themselves. 19 As Henry Smith has observed: "The
realists and their successors tirelessly have pointed out how older, more
'conceptualistic' or 'formalistic' modes of legal thinking and interpretation obscure
the richer reality to which law should respond. Property is one of the main
2
battlegrounds in this struggle." 00
This skepticism of formalism as applied to numerus clausus points to the
conclusion that the principle tends to be overemphasized in property scholarship and
doctrine.201 By the realists' lights, this overemphasis replicates the same intellectual
errors that attend formalist methodology generally. Henry Smith has summarized
this concern in the following manner:

'97 d. at 513.
1" Hanoch Dagan has stated the criticism the following manner: "[L]cgal realists argue that this type of
reasoning, which is an integral part of the conception of property as forms, is objectionable because it
falsely presents important value judgments made by judges as inevitable, obscuring their choices and

shielding them from empirical and normative critique." DAGAN, PROPERTY, supra note 45, at 8.
19 Id

2" Smith, Language, supra note 27, at 1106.
201 DAGAN, PROPERTY,

supra note 45, at 8.
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The realists and their successors argue that many features traditionally associated
with formalism-from literalistic interpretation to standardization of property
under the numerus clausus principle are nothing more than archaic relics. 202
Given this skepticism about formalism generally, it is not surprising that many
thinkers writing from the realist perspective have declined to directly engage with
numerus clausus. Many writing in this tradition have determined that the principle
does not warrant excessive attention, embodying as it does the very sort of false
"ruleness" that the realist critique strove to unseat. As Nestor Davidson has observed,
the realist project writ large is "challenging the formalism of extant legal categories"
and numerus clausus is nothing if not an affirmation of extant legal categories. 203
Hanoch Dagan has described this realist's principal property insights in the
following manner:
Property theorists usually invoke the bundle of sticks understanding in an effort
to ... liberate property law from the confines of sheer form. The bundle metaphor
captures the truism that ... [t]here is neither an a priori list of entitlements that the
owner of a given resource inevitably enjoys nor an exhaustive list of resources
that enjoy the status of property. 204
In other words, the realist insights purport to lay bare the fact in property, as
elsewhere in the law, the reason for a legal decision could not be merely that the
judge was constrained by a rule because judges were no more (or less) constrained
by rules in property than in any other doctrinal area of law. 205 Consequently, in the
realists' view, emphasis on formalism or "ruleness" is seriously misplaced.
Thus, in challenging formalism in property (and evocating challenges to
formalism writ large) critics of conceptualism raise three distinct concerns: (1) that
numerus clausus is an example of empty formalism that lacks a legitimate or inherent
utility or purpose within the doctrine; (2) that numerus clausus is not capable of

202 Smith, Language, supra note 27,
at

1107.

203 Davidson, supra note 9, at 1631.
204 DAGAN, PROPERTY, supra note 45, at 11.

20s Id. ("[T]he idea that legal concepts (in our context, the forms of property)
inevitably entail some
doctrinal conclusions is false .... It is thus futile to attempt ... to derive doctrinal conclusions by such
internal deductive reasoning.").
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constraining judicial decision-making in "hard cases"; (3) that reference to or
invocation of numerus clausus as the reason for a decision in a "hard case"
necessarily obscures the actual dynamics of decision-making in the case, which in
turn creates a situation rife for the imposition of a preference for entrenched
distributions of property.206 Each of these concerns is explored below.

I. FREEINGNUMERUS CLA USUS FROM THE REALIST
CRITIQUE

As discussed above, those that adopt a skeptical approach to the conceptualist
claims that numerus clausus is a criterial feature of property law have, on occasion,
objected to the principle (or in some cases, what they understand to be an overemphasis of the principle) along classically realist lines. They have expressed the
worry that numerus clausus represents a type of "empty" formalism. They have
expressed the concern that numerus clausus is not capable of constraining judicial
decision-making in "hard cases." Numerus clausus has also been criticized as a
distraction from or obfuscation of the actual dynamics of decision-making with
respect to the distribution of an asset. These ideas are explored in turn below.
A.

Numerus Clausus as "Empty" Formalism

A first concern about conceptualism in property has to do with skepticism about
the purpose or necessity of numerus clausus. Critics worry that numerus clausus
embodies an "empty" formalism that lacks a legitimate role within the doctrine. After
all, numerus clausus is a common law rule-by some lights as much judicial habit
as obligation. It is not the result of democratic deliberation nor is it derived from a
broader set of binding principles, as might issue from constitutional or international
law. It is strictly a creature of property doctrine. This fact, coupled with the fact that
numerus clausus imposes categorical forms upon the substantive intentions of parties
leads to the worry that judges may be employing formalism for its own sake, without
justification or benefit.
This argument is a variant of what Richard Pildes has termed "apurposive rulefollowing."2 07 This worry holds that there is nothing special about "property" that
2 08
requires (or even recommends) a principle of numerus clausus. Property

206 Id. at 8-9.
207

Richard H. Pilades, Forms ofFormalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 607, 612 (1999) (describing "apurposive

rule-following" as one of many forms of formalism).
208 See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 381 (1997) ("[The Realists] were
responsible for replacing in mainstream legal consciousness that conception with the disaggregated, more
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entitlements are similar to (or even identical to) entitlements that are conferred in
contract, tort, et cetera, and those entitlements are nothing more and nothing less than
what we decide they should be. 2 09
From this perspective, there is reason to be skeptical that the principle of
numerus clausus is anything more than an antiquated throw-back to feudal land
ownership. 210 On this view, resistance to abandoning the principle and adopting
novel forms of property is suspect, fueled, perhaps, by a normative preference to
preserve existing resource allocations. 211 In other words, the principle of numerus
clausus may simply be a principle of protecting existing interests at the peril of more
egalitarian aims. 212
In response to this worry, those associated with the conceptualist position have
offered various explanations of the principle.2 1 3 Rather than embodying a preference
for entrenched distributions, Merrill and Smith, for example, have argued that
numerus clausus reduces information costs associated with ownership. 21 4 Elsewhere,
I have argued that the principle serves to tame complexity and thereby render our
property systems intelligible.2 1 5 In my account, ontological features of object
ownership necessitates numerus clausus. Others have offered other possible
purposes, explanations, and/or functions of numerus clausus.216

explicitly social 'bundle of rights' conception .... From this point of view .. . property exists in whatever
resources have market value, and increasingly in American society the most valued goods are not the
tangible things but the intangible interests, expectations, and promises.").
2" See Merrill & Smith, What Happened, supra note 6, at 359-60 (tracing "the rise of the view among

modem legal economists that property is simply a list of use rights in particular resources").
2 10

211

d. at 364-66.
Id

212 See DAGAN, PROPERTY, supra note 45, at 9 ("Deductive formalism,
which uses legal concepts [here,
forms] as reasons rather than as conclusions, bars the way to open inquiry of the normative desirability of
alternative judicial decisions.").
213 See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 11 (explaining that numerus
clausus serves
to reduce information costs); Render, Complexity, supra note 8 (explaining that numerus clausus serves
to tame complexity in property).
214 Merrill & Smith, Interface, supra note 2, at 789-99.
215 Render, Complexity, supra note 8, at
12841.

216 See, e.g., Dorinan,supra note 69 (arguing that numerus clausus manifests a commitment
to democratic
self-government).
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It is worth noting that several scholars who do not identify as conceptualists
have offered potentially "benign" explanations for the presence of numerus clausus
in property doctrine. Hagan Dagan, for example, understands property forms to serve
as useful (although malleable) "default" modes of interacting with one another with
respect to the material world.217 Approaching the problem from a realist perspective,
Dagan's account understands property forms as "intermediary social constructs
218
through which law interacts with--reflects and shapes-our social values."
Limiting the forms of ownership "consolidates expectations and express[es] ideal
forms of relationship."219 The virtue of creating default "social constructs" appears
220
to be that it maintains the "normative integrity of the institutions of property."
Similarly, Nestor Davidson has suggested the formal rigidity of property forms
provides a stable structural platform for negotiating and contesting these competing
values, while the numerus clausus tolerance for flexibility within the content of the
forms accommodates inherent tensions in these values as they are applied in the
221
context of property rights. He contends, "standardization facilitates the regulation
of particular problems in property in a more targeted manner than regulating on a
system-wide basis (as with, for example, unconscionability in contract
regulation)."22 2 Moreover, he notes, that "resolving conflicts over a myriad of
competing priorities in property law has played out ... largely within the confines
of the forms."223
It is not necessary to rehearse here the relative strengths and weaknesses of
these various analyses, as they are offered only to highlight the unlikelihood that
nwnerus clausus serves no purpose whatsoever in property doctrine. Many, if not
most, of these are quite plausible descriptions of work that numerus clausus may be
doing within the doctrine of property. The fact that numerus clausus is a universal

217 Dagan, Craf, supra note 52, at 1520.
21

8 Id.

at 1565.

2 19

Id at 1567 ("Limiting the number of property forms and standardizing their content facilitates the roles
of property in consolidating expectations and expressing ideal forms of relationship.").
220 See DAGAN, PROPERTY, supra note 45, at 33.
221 Davidson, supra note 9, at 1652-53.

m Id. at 1653.
223

Id at 1654.
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feature of post-feudal property systems also serves to underscore the unlikelihood
that the principle is a form of "apurposive rule-following." 224

B.

The Problem of Capacity

Critics of numerus clausus have also presented the concern that rules lack the
capacity to constrain decision-making in a way that produces a unique or uniquely
justified result.225 This worry has been fairly leveled against "ruleness" in all
contexts, and it must be grappled with here. After all, if numerus clausus serves only
to afford the appearance of constraint, while in fact multiple valid alternative
resolutions are available to legal decision-makers, then the formalism of property
rules may indeed be serving only to obfuscate consequentialist preferences. 226
We can think about this critique in two steps. Step one contends with the
question of whether numerus clausus is capable of constraining judicial behavior in
a manner that can be said to be causal: i.e., does numerus clausus cause or produce
a result? The second step, on the other hand, wonders whether numerus clausus is
capable of producing a unique or uniquely justified result.

1.

Constraint

The contention that rules lack the causal capacity to constrain judicial decisionmaking meets with some difficulties in the context of numerus clausus. First, and
most superficially, if form restriction does not meaningfully constrain legal decisionmaking, it is difficult to account for the remarkable success of numerus clausus in
preventing new forms of ownership. If, for example, Dagan's account is correct that
property forms serve as "default frameworks" but that legal decision-makers should
(or, perhaps in reality, do) permit new forms where there is a good reason to do so,
we should expect to see novel forms of ownership recognized with some regularity.
Yet, this does not seem to be the case. Although reasonable minds can disagree
as to the exact number and content of cognizable property forms, over the last few
hundred years, a core compliment of Anglo-American forms (i.e., the fees, life
estates, defeasible estates, leaseholds) have remained relatively stable with the

2

See Pilades,supra note 207, at 612.

22 See Dagan, Craft, supra note 52, at 1567 (worrying that "deductive reasoning" from the "frozen forms

of property" is "misplaced" (a view he attributes to Merrill and Smith) and questioning whether it is "even
possible").
226 DAGAN, PROPERTY, supra note 45, at 9 (quoting Cohen and articulating
the worry that emphasis on

forms can cause us to "forget the social forces which mold the law and the social ideals by which the law

is to be judged").
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addition of only an arguable handful of newer forms (e.g., the mortgage, the trust)
and the elimination of fewer still (e.g., the fee tail).227 If form restriction lacks the
capacity to meaningfully constrain legal decision-making, how has numerus clausus
remained so successful at prohibiting customized or novel forms of ownership?
The answer lies in the phenomenon of rule-following. Much has been written
about whether and the degree to which rules can constrain decision-making and a
full treatment of the relevant analyses are both beyond the scope of this project and
unnecessary to address the concern in this context. Although it is an
oversimplification, it is sufficient here to observe that a rule constrains behavior if
the rule itself provides a reason for the rule-follower to comply with its imperative.
Numerus clausus is structured such that the application of its imperative is
relatively insensitive to context. If Henry Smith is correct that formalism is most
228
usefully understood as invariance to context then numerus clausus is among our
most formal of legal rules. Although there is no one authoritative formulation of the
rule, it might fairly be formulated as "no novel forms allowed." The rule operates as
a toggle: if a conveyance has created a recognized form, it is allowed. If the
conveyance has created anything other than a recognized form, it is disallowed.
There is only one variable that applies pressure to the application of the rule (i.e.,
whether the interest is a recognized interest) and it is a relatively simple (as opposed
to complex) variable in that it operates as a toggle, rather than say a threshold as
would be the case if numerus clausus permitted novel interests under certain
circumstances.
Another way of thinking about this point is that there exists an inverse
relationship between a rule's "formality" and the number and complexity of
variables that come to bear in its application. In turn, the number and complexity of
variables that must be brought to bear on a rule's application is determined in large
part by the degree to which the rule's imperative succeeds in limiting the rule's
extension. An exploration of numerus clausus' mechanism for limiting its extension
as well as its utility in serving a coordination function follows.

But see Carol M. Rose, Property in All the Wrong Places?, 114 YALE L.J. 991, 1006 n.59 (2005)
(reviewing MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (2003)) ("[T]he relevant standardized
227

forms clearly change over time; no real estate lawyer today knows much about the dizzying array of
'incorporeal hereditaments' that Blackstone described (e.g., advowsons, dignities, and corodies), whereas
Blackstone knew nothing of condominium restrictions and time-shares.").
228 Smith, Language, supra note 27, at 1135-36.
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The Elimination of Variables

H.L.A. Hart famously stated, "[i]n all fields of experience, not only that of
rules, there is a limit, inherent in the nature of language, to the guidance which
general language can provide." 229 In other words, rules are a tool that we may employ
to guide us towards solutions, but they are not themselves solutions. It may seem like
a failing-and a serious one at that-that rules are ill-equipped to resolve legal
problems given that positive law and our accepted forms of legal reasoning are little
more than a great web of rules. In this light, the whole of our legal system may seem
suddenly to be built upon an alarmingly inadequate construct.
Yet, this worry about rules' inadequacy is mitigated once we consider that a
rule's task, its charge, its raison d'dtre, is not to resolve problems. Instead, a rule's
task is to limit the number of relevant variables that bear on a given decision.
Consider, for example, a rule that prohibits wearing hats in church. The rule
seems fairly straightforward until we consider whether a headscarf "counts" as a hat
under the rule. Here we see an instantiation of problem mentioned earlier: the rule
cannot resolve the problem of whether a headscarf "counts" as a hat. Nonetheless,
the rule has done some work. Assuming we try to decide what to wear to church in
light of the rule, the rule has eliminated from our consideration all entities that we
all agree "count" as hats in all contexts-a baseball hat, a cowboy hat, a fedora.
Moreover, with respect to these entities to which the rule plainly obtains (i.e.,
uncontroversial "hats") the rule has removed from our consideration any number of
reasons why wearing a hat might be a good idea. The rule has thus succeeded in
rendering irrelevant a number of variables that would otherwise be relevant to our
decision. It has succeeded in narrowing our scope of consideration.
Narrowing the scope of consideration is the charge of rules of all stripes. All
(intelligible) rules distinguish-to varying degrees--entities that fall within the
extension of the rule from those that do not. Some rules leave little doubt as to what
entities fall within its extension (as in the rule "two plus two equals four"). Other
rules do less work in eliminating variables (as in the rule "like cases must be treated
alike"). The degree to which a rule is able to limit the number of variables that bear
a question depends upon two factors: (1) the constitution of the boundaries of the

229 HART,

supra note 30, at 126.
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concepts that comprise the imperative of the rule; and (2) the variability of the
30
consequent. 2
Variability of the consequent is of the simpler of these two to identify. A rule's
consequent is the consequence of the application of the rule.231 It is what happens if
the rule obtains. 232 "Variability" here means the degree to which the consequence of
the application of the rule is contingent. For example, consider the rule: "Violators
may be prosecuted." There are two points in the application of the rule during which
variables come into play. First, the decision-maker must determine who "counts" as
a violator. The number and complexity of variables that come into play at this stage
depends upon the boundaries of the concept "violators" as it is used in the rule, a
point we will return to momentarily.
The second point in which variables may enter is the consequent stage. Once
we have apprehended the class to whom the rule obtains (i.e., who "counts" as a
"violator"), the rule will dictate what is to happen. The rule's consequent may be
necessary or it may be contingent. In the example of "violators may be prosecuted"
the consequent is contingent. The question of what will happen if the rule obtains is
subject to further variables. In contrast, if the imperative of the rule was "violators
must be prosecuted," then the consequent would be necessary. If one "counts" as a
violator then one must be prosecuted and no further variables are at play.
Now let us consider the consequent of numerus clausus. Assuming our
formulation of "no novel forms allowed," the consequent of numerus clausus is
necessary. If an entity "counts" as a novel form, then is must not be allowed. There
is no contingency in the consequent, which serves to limit the number of variables
that bear on the application of the rule.
This returns us to the first and more vexing point at which variables may come
into play in the application of a rule: the constitution of the boundaries of the
concepts that comprise the imperative of the rule. The concept that comprises the
imperative of numerus clausus is the concept of "novel form." If an entity "counts"
as a novel form, then the rule obtains. But how does a legal decision-maker decide
what "counts" as a novel form?

230 See SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 163, at 23 (describing a rule's "consequent" as "prescribing what is
to happen if the conditions specified in the factual predicate obtain").
231 Id.
2 32

d
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To answer that question, we must consider how the concept of "novel form" is
bounded. To be coherent, a concept must encompass a set of criteria that
distinguishes the concept from other concepts. 233 The concept of "blue," for example,
would have no content if anything could be fairly described as blue and nothing could
be excluded from it. The same may be said for every concept. However, it is not
always clear how boundaries render concepts coherent.
Consider, for example, the phenomenon of baldness. 234 Baldness is a concept
that is bounded by a threshold. We know that baldness exists, and we can identify
specific instances of baldness, but what distinguishes a haired person from a bald
person? Being possessed of a single hair probably does not remove one from the
category of "bald," yet what about being possessed of ten hairs? Or twenty? At what
point does a haired person cross the threshold into baldness? If we were to apply the
rule "only bald people are permitted," we must engage with a number of variables to
determine to whom the rule obtains.
However, the number of variables which bear on the question of what "counts"
as "bald" is reduced precipitously if we transform the concept of "bald" into a
concept that is bounded by a rule rather than a threshold. If, for example, the term
"bald" referred to any person with less than twenty hairs on her head, then we would
be able to point to the "rule of twenty" as ajustification for our use of the term "bald."
The "rule of twenty," were it to exist, may also serve as a basis of criticism of
someone's "incorrect" use of the term.
Of course, when we apply a rule to bound the concept "bald" we face the same
problem of applying that rule as we do when we apply any rule. The number and
complexity of variables that attend the "rule of twenty" is determined by the
variability of its consequent and the constitution of the boundaries of the concepts
that comprise its imperative. To apply the "rule of twenty" we would have to
determine what "counts" as "twenty" and what "counts" as a "hair," and so on. The
imperative of the "rule of twenty" itself may be comprised of concepts that are
bounded thresholds that are as every bit as porous as the concept of "bald" itself. But
to the degree that the concepts that comprise the "rule of twenty" do a better job of
excluding variables than the concept of "bald" itself, then the "rule of twenty" has

m See generally Render, Boundaries,supra note 87.
4 The example of baldness is often used to describe what is known as "little by little" arguments (also
described as the sorites paradox, which is discussed infra). The specific example of baldness has been
attributed to the Megarian logician Eubulides ofMiletus. Dominic Hyde, Sorites Paradox, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Winter 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win20l I/entries/
sorites-paradox/.
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succeeded in its "ruleness"-that is, it has succeeded in cabining the host of variables
that come to bear on the application of the concept "bald."
Returning now to numerus clausus, the concept of "novel form" is bounded by
a set of rules rather than a threshold. What "counts" as a "novel form" depends upon
the rules that constitute our extant forms, and thus, application of numerus clausus
depends upon the application of those rules.
At this juncture, a problem may appear: if numerus clausus depends upon the
application of the rules of property forms (i.e., the fees, the life estate, et cetera), and
those rules are vulnerable to the criticisms of indeterminacy and/or the lack of
capacity to constrain, then is numerus clausus equally subject to those same
criticisms?
However, a close consideration of the function of numerus clausus reveals this
not to be the case. Numerus clausus does not constitute the category of "novel form."
It leaves the constitution of that category to exogenous rules. Those exogenous rules
may get the answer wrong-finding, for example, that a given conveyance "counts"
as a leasehold, when it should not "count" as a leasehold. Alternatively, justifiable
application of the exogenous rules may lead to multiple justifiable results. But once
the interest in question has been authoritatively characterized as either a recognized
form (in which case a package of powers attaches) or a novel form (in which case
the interest is disallowed and/or amended) numerus clausus'job is merely to ensure
that its consequent obtains. Thus, numerus clausus succeeds as long as a legal
decision does not enforce something that has been authoritatively identified (by
application of the exogenous rules) as a "novel form."
So even assuming the rules that constitute the forms fail to produce uniquely
justifiable results, numerus clausus is still able to produce a uniquely justifiable-if
highly formal-correct result. The imperative of form restriction is to eliminate novel
or highly idiosyncratic property interests so that our property rights remain
comprehensible. In this light, form restriction's success is measured not by the
degree that it ensures that property interests are justifiably categorized, but instead
by the degree to which it ensures that authoritatively categorized interests are
correctly sorted into those that are allowed (i.e., recognized) and those that are
disallowed (i.e., novel). An elaboration of this idea follows.
b.

Coordination Function

The toggle of numerus clausus may best be described as a coordination rule.
Numerus clausus plays only a very modest role in determining legal outcomes (i.e.,
the distribution of the asset). In describing the prescriptive force of numerus clausus,
it becomes clear that numerusclausus' primary influence on the distribution of assets
involves denying individualized ownership packets. Mrs. Lide, for example, is not
able to convey a fee that lacks the power to transfer.
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Given this fact, we might reasonably be concerned that the role that numerus
clausus plays in determining legal outcomes is itself unjustified. In applying
prescriptive pressure to legal decision-makers to mold property interests into extant
categories, a substantial degree of innovation and autonomy is sacrificed. Moreover,
because numerus clausus provides little in the way of guidance as to which
ownership prerogatives should be altered to comport with existing categories (or
even which category is the closest approximation to grantor's intention) we may be
concerned that numerus clausus is indeed obscuring "the social forces which mold
the law and the social ideals by which the law is to be judged." 235
To some degree this concern is mitigated by the understanding that numerus
clausus only commands that interests must conform to extant categories, it does not
determine whether a given interest succeeds or what should be done about it if it does
not. Therefore, there are multiple points of decision surrounding yet exogenous to
numerus clausus where the "richer reality"2 36 of legal decision-making remains
unobscured.
Moreover, aside from the manifested preference against novel estates, there is
no normative commitment implied by numerus clausus. There is no normative
content to the rule aside from the singular commitment to prohibit individualized
interests. The command of form restriction is not to arrive at a correct or even a
substantively justifiable classification of an interest in a given dispute, but rather to
arrive at a classification. In this sense, form restriction as a rule set shares more in
common with rules of etiquette, rules of language, or the rules of a game.
The rules of etiquette, rules of language, or the rules of a game serve primarily
to coordinate behavior among people. In these contexts, it is more important that
adherents to the rule system are able to identify the rule, than the content of the rule
itself. For example, it does not matter very much whether an etiquette rule requires
one to smile upon meeting a stranger or not. It does matter, however, that adherence
to the etiquette rules system are able to identify what "counts" as polite behavior so
as to avoid offense. Similarly, it does not matter much whether the rules of basketball
permit dunking or not, but it does matter that adherents of the rule system are able to
identify what "counts" as a basket.

2 Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,81112(1935).
3

Smith, Language, supra note 27, at 1106.

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawrevicw.2017.497
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

THE

CONCEPT

OF

PROPERTY

PAGE

|

487

Form restriction similarly serves a coordination function. To illustrate this
237
point, consider the rule that we must drive on the right side of the street. What is
the purpose of such a rule? First and foremost, the purpose is to prevent us from
colliding with one another in our cars. It is a rule that solves a coordination
problem.238 The rule embodies a preference for the right side over the left side, but
there is no (or a least very little) normative content to that preference. The
prescriptive force of the rule is directed at avoiding collisions. It really does not
matter much whether motorists drive on the right (as we do in the United States) or
motorists drive on the left (as one finds in the United Kingdom, for example), as long
as all motorists in the same place drive on the same side. Therefore, the choice of left
versus right itself does not require a great deal of justification. There is simple very
little in way of normative content in that choice.
An analogy can be made to numerus clausus. It does not matter much (except
to the individuals involved in a given dispute) whether a conveyance creates a fee
simple determinable or a fee simple subject to condition subsequent, but it matters
greatly that we know that a novel or idiosyncratic interest has not been created. In
disallowing the idiosyncratic interest, numerus clausus serves to stave off what
would otherwise be an overwhelmingly complex reality of standing in normative
relation to objects in the world. This is the worst-case-scenario that numerus clausus
avoids, just as the driving-on-the-left rule avoids the worst-case-scenario that follows
in the absence of its coordinating function.
In this light, it is possible to observe that any concern about a lack of constraint
and/or indeterminacy that attends numerus clausus lies not in the potential to expand
or contract the list of forms, but it arises in the context of determining whether a
given conveyance fits a given form. Consider again, by way of example, the pro se
testator who creates an ambiguous conveyance. If she has created a fee simple, her
elderly sister-in-law will remain in possession of the decedent's house. On the other
hand, if testator created a life estate, the sister-in-law will be dispossessed of her
home. It may be that applying the rules that determine whether a conveyance
"counts" as a life estate or "counts" as a fee simple to the facts of this case (i.e., the
language of this particular conveyance) will not render a unique result. More
specifically, application of the rules which bound those forms may not produce a
uniquely justified result-either determination (i.e., that the conveyance created a
fee simple or, alternatively, that the conveyance created a life estate) maybe be

237 See LEWIS, supra note 29, at 22-25 (discussing the rule that we drive on one side of the road as a
convention to coordinate behavior).
238 Id
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justifiable in light of the relevant rules, the facts of the case, and the norms of legal
reasoning.
If this is the case, then it would seem that the realist critique is well-taken and
that form restriction only serves to obscure the actual dynamics of legal decisionmaking in such an instance. But this understanding misapprehends the work that
form restriction is doing in such a case. Numerus clausus does not necessarily
produce a unique answer to the question: "which form of ownership did testator
create?" However, form restriction does provide a unique answer to the question:
"did testator create a new form of ownership?" In light of the imperative of numerus
clausus, the only justifiable answer to that question is "no."
In this light, form restriction does not select among competing plausible or
justifiable outcomes. Instead, the prescriptive power of form restriction lies in the
imposition of selection itself-regardless of which estate is selected. Numerus
clausus works to eliminate all possible resolutions that lie outside the list of extant
estates.
Recall the case of Mrs. Lide's testamentary gift to her sister-in-law,
Mrs. White. In the absence of numerus clausus, there would be no need to select
among existing forms of ownership. Instead, the will would create an estate that is
customized to Mrs. Lide's particular preferences. Mrs. White would then have an
individualized estate: a fee simple that she lacked the power to transfer. Instead of
choosing between option A (a fee simple) and option B (a life estate), the conveyance
would create a novel option: the Lide estate.
Numerus clausus disallows the creation of the novel estate. It applies
prescriptive pressure such that legal decision-makers are bound to select among
existing options.
Of course, reasonable disagreements may emerge as to whether a particular
conveyance does or should "count" as falling within the extension of a particular
form. Applying, for example, the rules of language, the rules of construction, and the
various rules that constitute each form (i.e., rules that tell us what "counts" as a fee
simple, and what "counts" as a life estate, et cetera), a legal decision-maker might
reasonably conclude that Mrs. Lide created a fee simple and a legal decision-maker
might also reasonably conclude that she created life estate. Indeed, these views were
respectively articulated by the majority and the dissent in White v. Brown.
Thus, the question that numerus clausus resolves does not concern how the
asset should or will be distributed-a question to which there may well be multiple
plausible resolutions in light of the rules of language, the rules of construction, the
broad substantive rules of property (e.g., rules prohibiting unreasonable restraints on
alienation) and the rules that constitute each form. Instead numerus clausus tells us
that whatever the substantive collection of ownership powers that has been created
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by a given conveyance, those powers must be fairly describable as falling within the
extension of one our existing ownership categories. In other words, numerus clausus
tells us that every enforceable estate will be referred to (and identifiable as) a fee
simple, a life estate, a leasehold, and so forth.
2.

The Problems of Obfuscation and False Constraint

A final criticism of the formalism of numerus clausus should be addressed.
Critics have voiced the worry that focus on numerus clausus obscures the actual
dynamics of decision-making in the context of the distribution of assets, because the
decision-maker either genuinely believes-or disingenuously states-that she is
constrained by the principle of numerus clausus in a manner that results in a
particular distribution. In the case of Mrs. Lide, this claim would hold that the court
believed (or claimed to believe) that it was required by numerus clausus find the
Mrs. Lide's conveyance created either a life estate or a fee simple. The court was not
permitted to find a fee simple that lacked the power to transfer.
Yet, while it is the case that the imperative of numerus clausus disallows the
novel estate of a fee simple that lacks the power to transfer, the distribution of the
asset in Mrs. Lide's case (or, arguably, in any case) does not turn on the application
of numerus clausus. Numerus clausus only serves to eliminate option 3-the novel
estate. Numerus clausus does not tell us anything about whether option 1 (the life
estate) or option 2 (the fee simple) should be selected. As discussed above, rules
exogenous to numerus clausus guide that decision.
Further, it is in selecting between options 1 and 2 that determines the
distribution of the asset. If option 1 is selected, distant relatives will end up with the
asset. If option 2 is selected, the favored niece will be the recipient. Numerus clausus
has nothing to say about how this decision will be or should be made.
In this way, the concern that numerus clausus serves to invidiously and
artificially entrench existing property distributions to the peril of egalitarian
redistributive efforts is premised on a misunderstanding about the role that property
forms play in the distribution of assets.
Further, no one contends that the principle of numerus clausus prohibits
legislative (or even executive branch) imposition on individual property rights. The
formalism found in property does not impinge upon the ability of the collective to
impose upon individual property rights. On the contrary, the rules that tell us what
"counts" as an enforceable property interest are frequently changed by collective
action. Numerus clausus does not prevent a legislature from eliminating (or even
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inventing) property forms. Consider the estate in fee tail.239 All but four states have
eliminated it as a property form. 24 The fate of the tenancy by the entirety may
someday be similar as it no longer exists in a majority of states. 24 1
Neither the fact that we have a limited set of forms, nor the content of the
particular forms that we have (e.g., fee simple versus life estate) significantly impacts
the distribution of assets across a property system. Instead it is our broad property
prescriptions-such as those that prohibit discrimination, or protect alienability, or
ensure that residential rental property is fit for human habitation-that most
dramatically shape our distributional landscape. These rules emerge from both the
common law and, increasingly, from legislative action, and numerus clausus does
not affect them in any way. For example, a growing number of states have eliminated
the common law form of the Rule Against Perpetuities, which for centuries served
as a significant constraint on the creation of future interests.2 4 2 Settled equitable
principles can likewise be realigned by judicial or legislative prerogative and the
application of numerus clausus does nothing to constrain that realignment.
Thus, in terms of distributive sting, the realist critique of formalism, although
insightful as applied to many doctrinal areas, simply misses the point in property-at least as it has been applied to the principle of numerus clausus. Property forms
serve as tools that aid us in organizing property interests into distributional packages,
but they do not tell us where or to whom the packages are to be delivered.
Henry Smith has analogized the rules that comprise numerus clausus and our
individual property forms to the rules which structure language. 24 3 In this light, to

2

DUKEMNNIER ET AL., supra note 9, at 321.

2

Id (describing the decline of the fee tail in American property law).

241

id

242 Id

at 307A08 (describing the perpetuities reform movement).

243 Smith, Language, supra note 27, at 1107-08 ("Relatively context-sensitive realism
and relatively
acontextual formalism can be seen as points along a spectrum of methods of striking a tradcoff between
communicating a lot to a few or a little to many. This informational tradeoff points to an unacknowledged
tension lurking in the realist project of coupling nuanced decisionmaking with concern for the audience:
Not all audiences-especially large and heterogeneous audiences-ean process nuanced messages at
reasonable cost. The realists and their successors argue that many features traditionally associated with
formalism-from literalistic interpretation to standardization of property under the numerus clausus
principle-are nothing more than archaic relics. Controversy has centered on how far, if at all, the benefits
of certainty in the law mitigate the inevitable incorrect results in some cases-much less the promotion
of unattractive and outmoded values. But, some of these 'formalistic' devices reflect the need to limit the
cost of processing messages about legal relations that are broadcast to wide audiences. If everyone in the
world is expected to respect an owner's right to Blackacre, the content of that right cannot be too
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say that the principle of numerus clausus is an inherently politically conservative
principle because it supports existing property forms is like saying that our linguist
practice is inherently politically conservative because it supports existing usage and
syntax. The existence of a system that limits our property forms no more causes
particular distributions (or impedes redistributions) of resources than the existence
of a limited set of usage and syntax causes us to express particular ideas. It would be
ridiculous to say that Susan B. Anthony said: "Resistance to tyranny is obedience to
God" because the words existed. Just as the existence of words enables (but do not
cause) particular expressions, the existence of a system of fixed property forms
enables the delivery of particular packages of distributions, but it does not cause them
to be delivered.
Now it may be the case that we say certain things (and not other things) because
certain words exist, and this, too, finds an analogical home in property forms. The
existence of certain forms of property may hinder egalitarian or redistributive
goals-here, the obsolete fee tail and the relatively "neologistic" (to extend the
metaphor) "dynasty trust" come to mind. Both of these property forms have the
potential to legally entrench resources beyond what we might consider to be a
desirable span of ownership. Consequently, the existence of these two property forms
potentially hinders egalitarian resource distribution. Yet, if we find this problematic,
the solution is not to do away with numerus clausus and the system of fixed property
forms altogether. The solution is to do away with those property forms (as most states
2
have in the case of the fee tail). 44
The point is, having a relatively stable compliment of property forms does not
necessarily mean that the content of those forms will be inherently inclined to
preserve existing resource allocations, or that the content of the forms will
necessarily encourage inequitable (or equitable) resource distributions. The content
of our property forms is (and will continue to be) what we have the political will to
make it. Moreover, our broad property proscriptions (which in most instances are
more important in terms of distribution than the content of our forms) are likewise
perennially amendable by legislative realignment just as in other common law
doctrinal areas. In this sense, our legal practice of property is at least as "democratic"

complicated or idiosyncratic without placing a large burden on many third parties. On the other hand,
when two parties are deep within an ongoing relationship, their contractual language can be given
substantial deference in all its idiosyncrasies. This even extends to a court's enforcing such idiosyncrasies
as long as a court's efforts are likely to achieve accuracy at reasonable cost. Various situations fall between
these extremes, and the law will accordingly adopt interpretive methods of an intermediate sort.").
244

Id at 1107-08.
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an endeavor as any of the other doctrinal areas to which it is so frequently
unfavorably compared.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the conceptualist/non-conceptualist divide in property is not facile as
conventional wisdom would suggest. Rather than reflecting differences in preferred
value sets or favored outcomes for the distribution of assets, the conceptualist/nonconceptualist divide is centered on the significance of form restriction in property.
Many conceptualists understand form restriction to be a criterial feature of property,
while non-conceptualists reject this as a descriptive proposition.
Moreover, in addition to voicing skepticism about the description picture of
numerus clausus that conceptualists have offered, non-conceptualists have worried
that form restriction in property is unduly formalist. They have raised the concerns
that numerus clausus is a manifestation of "empty" formalism, that the rule lacks the
capacity to constrain judicial decision-making, and that emphasis on the rule serves
only to obscure the actual dynamics ofjudicial decision-making.
However, these concerns are predicated on a misapprehension of numerus
clausus. Numerus clausus does not exert pressure on a decision-maker to favor a
particular distribution of the asset in question. Rather than purporting to guide a
decision-maker to a uniquely justifiable classification of the asset in question (and
thereby determine distribution), numerus clausus serves only to eliminate
idiosyncratic interests. In this way, the principle of numerus clausus, although highly
formalistic, avoids the problems of formalism generally because the function of form
restriction is not to arrive at a correct or even a substantively justifiable outcome in
a given dispute, but rather to arrive at an outcome. The function of form restriction
is to eliminate idiosyncratic interests so that our property rights remain
comprehensible.
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